From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law by Galbraith, Jean
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2017 
From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing 
Landscape of Foreign Relations Law 
Jean Galbraith 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, American Politics Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, 
International Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation 
Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public Law and 
Legal Theory Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Galbraith, Jean, "From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign 
Relations Law" (2017). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1741. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1741 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 




From Treaties to International 
Commitments: The Changing Landscape of 
Foreign Relations Law 
Jean Galbraith† 
Sometimes the United States makes international commitments in the manner 
set forth in the Treaty Clause. But far more often it uses congressional-executive 
agreements, sole executive agreements, and soft-law commitments. Scholars of for-
eign relations law typically approach these other processes from the perspective of 
constitutional law, seeking to determine the extent to which they are constitutionally 
permissible. In contrast, this Article situates the myriad ways in which the United 
States enters into international commitments as the product not only of constitu-
tional law, but also of international law and administrative law. Drawing on all 
three strands of law provides a rich understanding of the various processes for mak-
ing international commitments and of the circumstances under which a particular 
process will be used. This approach also has important implications for separation-
of-powers concerns. From a constitutional-law perspective, the rise of international 
commitments outside the Treaty Clause registers as an unvarnished increase in 
presidential power. Factoring in international law and administrative law reveals 
a far more nuanced reality. While direct congressional checks on presidential power 
have weakened, alternative checks have arisen from administrative agencies, the in-
ternational legal structure, and even to some degree from US states. This Article 
describes the reconfigured landscape of checks and balances, which are spread 
across the negotiation, domestic approval, and implementation of international 
commitments. It then offers a qualified normative defense of this system and pro-
poses several structural and doctrinal improvements. The Article closes with a case 
study applying its approach to the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his farewell address, George Washington urged that “[t]he 
great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is . . . to 
have with them as little political connection as possible.”1 This 
advice illustrates just how wide a gap exists between the world of 
the Founders and the present day. No longer a small nation strug-
gling for respect, the United States now does not and could not 
manage its affairs in the absence of strong international coopera-
tion. It has countless ongoing international commitments and 
continues to pursue new ones.2 During the Obama administra-
tion, the United States joined the New START treaty on arms 
 
 1 George Washington, Farewell Address of Sept 17, 1796, in James D. Richardson, 
ed, 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 205, 214 (Bureau of Na-
tional Literature 1897). 
 2 Because this Article focuses on how the United States participates in international 
commitments, all references to “international commitments,” “international agreements,” 
and “treaties” refer to those involving the United States (unless otherwise specified). I use 
“international commitments” broadly to cover formalized exchanges of promises by the 
United States and one or more other nations, regardless of whether these promises are 
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control, the Basel III accords on international financial regula-
tion, the Iran deal regarding nuclear nonproliferation, the 
Paris Agreement addressing climate change, and numerous 
lower-profile commitments. The Trump administration is more 
skeptical of international cooperation and has already an-
nounced its intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Yet 
it too may well end up making or revising at least some im-
portant commitments.3 
A striking feature of these international commitments is the 
diversity of legal pathways by which the United States joins 
them. The Treaty Clause of the Constitution empowers the pres-
ident to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate.4 This is the only way to enter into international 
commitments that is specified in the Constitution, and yet today 
international commitments are routinely reached in other ways. 
Of the four commitments named above, only one—the New 
START treaty—has gone through the process set out in the 
Treaty Clause.5 The others have all followed different paths. 
Basel III is nonbinding as a matter of international law and is 
being implemented by administrative agencies through powers 
delegated to them under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act6 and preexisting statutes.7 The Iran 
deal is also nonbinding as a matter of international law, and the 
executive branch can meet the US commitments under it by de-
ploying previously delegated statutory authority.8 The Paris 
Agreement is binding under international law and took effect 
without any specific congressional approval, although the Obama 
administration intended to tie its implementation to previously 
 
binding under international law. I use “international agreements” more narrowly to refer 
to instruments that contain commitments that are binding as a matter of international 
law. I use “treaties” still more narrowly to refer to agreements that go through the process 
set out in the Treaty Clause. 
 3 See Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing the “Countering Amer-
ica’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Aug 
2, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9TG-P5HT (stating that “[a]s President, I can make 
far better deals with foreign countries than Congress”). 
 4 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. 
 5 See Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the New START Treaty with the 
Russian Federation, 111th Cong, 2d Sess, in 156 Cong Rec 23472 (Dec 22, 2010). 
 6 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
 7 See Jean Galbraith and David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cor-
nell L Rev 735, 784–87 (2014). 
 8 See Jack Goldsmith, Why Congress Is Effectively Powerless to Stop the Iran Deal 
(and Why the Answer Is Not the Iran Review Act) (Lawfare, July 20, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GB4U-SC5A. 
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delegated administrative authority.9 A fifth major agreement ne-
gotiated by the Obama administration—the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)—would have required approval and imple-
mentation by congressional legislation but has since been aban-
doned by the Trump administration.10 Collectively, these exam-
ples illustrate that the US process for making international 
commitments has become multifaceted rather than unitary. 
Scholars of foreign relations law typically break down US 
participation in international agreements into three main catego-
ries: treaties entered into pursuant to the Treaty Clause, 
congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agree-
ments.11 Congressional-executive agreements “are concluded by 
the president with either the advance authorization or subse-
quent approval of a majority of both houses of Congress.”12 Sole 
executive agreements “are concluded by the president alone.”13 
This three-part categorization is long-standing—dating back at 
least to the 1920s—and has become “Lesson I of Foreign Relations 
Law 101.”14 Yet its usefulness is increasingly questionable. In a 
speech given during his tenure as State Department Legal Ad-
viser, Professor Harold Koh criticized this framework as a “pro-
crustean construct,” observing that international agreements of-
ten “do not fall neatly into any of these boxes.”15 This three-part 
categorization also takes account only of agreements that are 
 
 9 See Senior State Department Official on the Paris Agreement Signing Ceremony 
(US Department of State, Apr 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/VK2Y-JWMD; Juliet 
Eilperin, Obama Hails ‘Historic’ Ratification of Paris Climate Agreement (Wash Post, Oct 
5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/JKY8-FE2R. 
 10 See Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(White House Office of the Press Secretary, Feb 3, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/J5BY
-34N5; Presidential Memorandum regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, Jan 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6FCM-A36J. 
 11 For coverage in leading treatises, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Interna-
tional Law in the US Legal System 31–95 (Oxford 2013); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs 
and the United States Constitution 175–224 (Oxford 2d ed 1996); Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303 (1987). In these and other sources, 
there are several variations on the overall terminology—for example, sole executive agree-
ments are sometimes called presidential agreements, and congressional-executive agree-
ments and sole executive agreements are sometimes collectively referred to as executive 
agreements. An additional category, which scholars frequently note but tend to treat more 
briefly, is that of agreements entered into by the executive branch that are authorized by 
a preexisting treaty. 
 12 Bradley, International Law at 75 (cited in note 11). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 
101 Georgetown L J 725, 726 (2013). For the origins of the categorization, see Part I.A. 
 15 Id at 727, 732. 
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binding under international law and thus does not cover purely 
nonbinding commitments, even those as important as Basel III or 
the Iran deal. 
The emphasis on these three categories is problematic for a 
deeper reason, as well. It frames the process of making interna-
tional commitments using the lens of constitutional law. The very 
names “congressional-executive agreements” and “sole executive 
agreements” evoke Articles I and II, and most scholarship engag-
ing with these categories has focused on the extent to which the 
Constitution permits their use.16 But as important and founda-
tional as this constitutional question indisputably is, there are 
other questions that one should ask, including: How does the 
United States decide which form of international commitment it 
will use? And what structural checks and balances operate in the 
current system? Answering these questions from a constitutional-
law perspective will at best give rise to only partial answers, and 
at worst may give rise to misleading ones. 
This Article explores the multiple pathways available for 
making international commitments. To understand the struc-
tural landscape in which they exist, we must take into account 
three strands of law—not just constitutional law, but also inter-
national law and administrative law. Each strand plays a crucial 
role in shaping how the United States makes international com-
mitments. The structure of the international legal system both 
encourages the use of multiple pathways and affects what path-
ways are available in particular contexts. Constitutional law 
places meaningful doctrinal limits on the available pathways, 
although these limits now have more force with regard to how in-
ternational commitments are implemented than with regard to 
how they are made in the first place. Perhaps most significantly, 
administrative law influences the choice of pathways by affecting 
how international commitments can be implemented, by underly-
ing the State Department’s internal process for determining 
 
 16 See, for example, Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future 
of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L J 1236, 1338–49 (2008); 
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va L Rev 1573, 1578–
1617, 1654–60 (2007); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional 
Method, 79 Tex L Rev 961, 964–1009 (2001); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements 
and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 NC L Rev 133, 160–83, 218–35 (1998); David M. Golove, 
Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 NYU L Rev 1791, 1798–1805 (1998); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 Harv L Rev 1221, 1228–35 (1995); Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, 
Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv L Rev 799, 808–13 (1995). 
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which pathway to pursue in a given context, and by shaping who 
is at the negotiating table for the United States. 
This approach has important implications for separation-of-
powers concerns. From the vantage point of constitutional law, 
the rise of myriad paths for making international commitments 
amounts to an unvarnished win for presidential power. The pres-
ident has the power to choose which pathway to domestic ap-
proval to pursue for an international commitment, conditional on 
the use of this pathway being deemed constitutional. The more 
constitutionally permissible options there are, the more the pres-
ident can evade the democratic and deliberative check of legisla-
tive review. As the Obama administration increasingly favored 
bypassing the subsequent approval of the Senate or Congress for 
international commitments, claims of presidential unilateralism 
followed quickly. “That’s outrageous, and it’s unlawful. And it’s a 
clear example of the executive overreach in the area of foreign 
affairs,” said the convener of a congressional hearing on the ad-
ministration’s decision to join the Paris Agreement without going 
to the Senate.17 
When all three strands of law are taken into account, the 
structural landscape looks quite different. For international law 
and administrative law have also given rise to constraints on 
presidential power. These constraints are ones that the Framers 
did not foresee, and yet they further James Madison’s goal of “con-
triving the interior structure of the government, as that its sev-
eral constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places.”18 These con-
straints arise at all stages of an international commitment—ne-
gotiation, domestic approval, and implementation. Some of these 
constraints are independent of the constitutional constraints, but 
others have their strongest bite at times when the constitutional 
constraints are the weakest. In other words, the more the presi-
dent seeks to bypass the Senate and Congress, the more he or she 
is likely to run up not only against constitutional concerns, but 
also against alternative constraints arising from international 
and administrative law and from institutions empowered by these 
 
 17 Executive Overreach in Foreign Affairs, Hearing before the Executive Overreach 
Task Force of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (2016) (“House 
Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing”) (statement of Rep King). 
 18 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 347–48 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). 
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bodies of law—including international organizations, administra-
tive agencies, and occasionally even US states. The president’s 
power with respect to international commitments is thus not the 
power to avoid constraints entirely. Rather, it is the power to 
choose between different types of constraints. 
The Paris Agreement exemplifies the structural claims made 
in this Article. From the perspective of constitutional limits on 
the approval process, it was a textbook example of unchecked 
presidential power. It was also a signature foreign policy achieve-
ment of President Barack Obama: in his words, a “historic” and 
“ambitious” agreement that will “establish[ ] the enduring frame-
work the world needs to solve the climate crisis.”19 Yet while his 
predecessors accepted the need to take the two prior major multi-
lateral agreements on climate to the Senate, Obama joined the 
United States to the Paris Agreement without seeking specific 
legislative approval—and did this precisely because such ap-
proval would not have been forthcoming. 
From a broader perspective, however, the Paris Agreement 
reveals constraint upon constraint. Partly to avoid constitutional 
issues related to approval, the Obama administration had to ac-
cept strong checks in relation to the Agreement’s negotiation and 
implementation. In the negotiations, the executive branch had to 
operate within the limits arising from the international legal pro-
cess, including a requirement of consensus, and yet persuade 
other nations to craft an agreement that satisfied its constitu-
tional concerns. This process was so fraught that even in the final 
moments the negotiations almost broke down over a single word.20 
During these negotiations, the executive branch also had to en-
sure that the resulting agreement could be implemented domes-
tically through authority previously delegated by the Clean Air 
Act21 to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
states. This in turn required US negotiators to tie their negotiat-
ing position to the scope of the Clean Air Act, to involve the EPA 
in the negotiating process, and to pay close attention to underly-
ing principles of administrative law and federalism. And as 
challenging as the negotiation of the Paris Agreement was for US 
 
 19 Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement (White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, Dec 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A75H-DL3M. 
 20 Joby Warrick, How One Word Nearly Killed the Climate Deal (Wash Post, Dec 13, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2JBX-98DU. 
 21 See Clean Air Act, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 
USC § 7401 et seq; Clear Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676; Clear 
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685. 
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negotiators, its future presents even more difficulties. President 
Donald Trump has already announced that he intends to with-
draw the United States from the Paris Agreement, although this 
may not be his final word on the subject.22 And even if the United 
States were to remain in the Paris Agreement, there would still 
be much to be worked out both internationally through the pro-
cess that governs further negotiations and domestically in terms 
of practical implementation. Overall, the story of the Paris 
Agreement illustrates both the reach and the limits of the presi-
dent’s power to make international commitments. 
This Article’s descriptive account of the current system for 
making international commitments stands apart from the desir-
ability of this system from a normative perspective. On the nor-
mative question, this Article goes on to offer a qualified defense 
of the current system. This system strikes a reasonable balance 
between two related problems of our contemporary governmental 
landscape: presidential overreaching and legislative inaction. As 
to presidential overreaching, it incorporates a set of constraints 
that reduce the risks of abuses of power. As to legislative inaction, 
it provides the executive branch with alternatives to obtaining 
specific approval from the Senate or Congress, while folding in 
alternative forms of democratic accountability. In general, the rise 
of the current system is broadly faithful to other developments 
within public law, including the way in which administrative-law 
values have come to complement and sometimes substitute for 
constitutional principles. 
The normative claims of this Article, if accepted, in turn have 
implications for several ongoing structural and doctrinal debates 
within the field of foreign relations law. One implication is that 
we should resist calls for sweeping changes to the process of how 
the executive branch makes international commitments, 
although some refinements would be beneficial. A second is that 
the Senate and Congress would do well to reduce the barriers to 
specific legislative approval that currently exist in order to give 
the executive branch more incentives to pursue traditional paths 
to approval. A third implication is that courts should be cautious 
 
 22 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (White House Office 
of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6GZ7-GJXP. But see 
Madeline Conway, Trump: ‘Something Could Happen’ on Paris Agreement (Politico, July 
13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5STQ-6TYX (describing Trump’s statement in a 
press conference that “something could happen with respect to the Paris accord. We’ll 
see what happens. . . . And if it happens, that will be wonderful, and if it doesn’t, that 
will be OK, too”). 
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in crediting certain strong claims of presidential power, including 
claims that the president and his or her agents have exclusive 
power to communicate with foreign governmental actors and 
claims that international commitments made solely by the exec-
utive branch have the power to preempt state law. 
The rest of the Article develops the arguments summarized 
above. Part I describes how constitutional law, international law, 
and administrative law each contribute to the reconfigured land-
scape of international commitments. Part II explores the role that 
presidential power plays under this framework and discusses the 
rise of a diffuse yet robust set of checks on this power. Part III 
offers a qualified defense of the existing system and proposes sev-
eral doctrinal improvements. Finally, Part IV illustrates the 
claims made in this Article through a case study of the Paris 
Agreement. 
Two caveats to this Article require particular mention. First, 
in describing international law and administrative law as sources 
of growing checks on presidential power, this Article does not seek 
to imply that they operate in the same way or to the same degree. 
As a general matter, international law tends to operate more as 
an independent check on presidential power, and administrative 
law tends to operate more as a substitute for constitutional 
checks—but both the strength of these checks and their degree of 
interconnection to constitutional checks are highly dependent on 
context. Second, this Article focuses on describing and evaluating 
the current landscape rather than on dating its various features. 
The origins of alternatives to the Treaty Clause lie deep in our 
constitutional history, and modern international and administra-
tive law began to influence the process by which the United States 
joins international commitments by at least the end of World 
War II. Regardless of whether the choices made by the Obama 
administration are characterized as incremental developments or 
seismic shifts, they illustrate the importance of all three strands 
of law for the process by which the United States joins interna-
tional commitments. That administration’s commitment to global 
engagement, the partisan gridlock in Congress, and the increased 
importance of international regulatory cooperation together put 
international commitments made without the explicit approval of 
the Senate or Congress at the center of US foreign policy. 
Looking ahead, the template created by the Obama admin-
istration may not get much use during the Trump administration. 
To date, Trump appears more focused on undoing international 
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commitments than on making new ones—and his actions make 
clear to the international community just how fragile interna-
tional commitments made without the Senate or Congress can be. 
But it is early in his term, and the creation or revision of other 
international commitments may lie ahead of him. Still further 
ahead, future presidents interested in pursuing international co-
operation will likely find the precedents from the Obama admin-
istration to be compelling, especially as legislative approval for 
international commitments will remain difficult to get in the ab-
sence of structural reforms. The international commitments of 
the Obama administration thus merit close scrutiny not only on 
their own account but also for the future. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THREE STRANDS OF LAW 
How should we understand the different ways in which the 
United States enters international commitments? This question 
is usually approached from the perspective of constitutional law, 
which requires reconciling today’s multifaceted practice with the 
much more unitary approach set out in the Constitution. But as 
interesting as the constitutional perspective is, it explains only a 
fraction of what is actually going on. A far more complete picture 
emerges when we look not just to constitutional law but also to 
international law and administrative law. This Part describes 
how each of these three strands of law shapes the processes by 
which the United States joins international commitments. 
A. Constitutional Law 
The Treaty Clause sets a high bar for treaty approval. Even 
in the nineteenth century, proponents of international coopera-
tion viewed the veto it gave to “a malcontent third” of the Senate 
as “the original mistake in the Constitution.”23 Especially with the 
development of the party system, the challenges of getting even 
slightly controversial treaties through the Senate have been and 
remain formidable. This in turn has led to deep interest in devel-
oping and justifying alternative paths to making international 
commitments. 
 
 23 Letter from John Hay to Henry Adams (Aug 5, 1899), quoted in W. Stull Holt, 
Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle between the President and the 
Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations 177 (Johns Hopkins 1933). 
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By the early twentieth century, scholars and practitioners 
were beginning to categorize these paths and assess their consti-
tutional reach.24 In 1922, not long after the Treaty of Versailles 
failed in the Senate, the solicitor for the State Department pre-
pared a memorandum for a leading member of Congress that 
identified two alternative paths to international agreements.25 
One path consisted of “agreements made pursuant to authority 
contained in acts of Congress” and the other of “agreements en-
tered into purely as executive acts without legislative authoriza-
tion.”26 As examples of the former, the memorandum named 
“postal arrangements made with foreign postal authorities; recip-
rocal tariff arrangements; arrangements respecting discrimina-
tory duties, copyrights and trademarks; and agreements made 
with Indians.”27 As examples of the latter, the memorandum em-
phasized “agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary 
claims of American citizens against foreign countries,” but also 
mentioned several examples pertaining to different issues.28 
The constitutional scope of these alternatives became an im-
portant issue during World War II. Could the United States join 
the future UN Charter through a process other than the Treaty 
Clause, thus preventing a minority of the Senate from dealing it 
the same fate as the Treaty of Versailles? In a 250-page article 
published in two parts in the Yale Law Journal, Professor Myres 
McDougal and Asher Lans argued in the affirmative.29 Their 
 
 24 For early articles analyzing historical practice, see generally John Bassett Moore, 
Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Polit Sci Q 385 (1905); James F. Barnett, Interna-
tional Agreements without the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 15 Yale L J 63 (1905). 
 25 See generally Memorandum from the Solicitor for the Department of State to Sen-
ator Henry Cabot Lodge on International Executive Agreements Not Submitted to the 
Senate (Aug 23, 1922) (on file with author). Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was the chair of 
the Foreign Relations Committee and bore significant responsibility for the failure of the 
Treaty of Versailles in the Senate. 
 26 Id at 1. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. The first thirty-one pages of the memorandum give examples of sole executive 
agreements in the claims-settlement context. See id at 2–31. Only the last two pages men-
tion other examples, some of them modi vivendi, related to military affairs, peace, fisher-
ies, and boundaries. Id at 32–33. 
 29 See generally Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 
54 Yale L J 181 (1945); Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: II, 
54 Yale L J 534 (1945). Other important contemporary scholars engaged with these con-
stitutional questions as well, reaching a range of conclusions. See Ackerman and Golove, 
108 Harv L Rev at 853–56, 866–73 (cited in note 16) (summarizing the debates). The UN 
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analysis used categories similar to those set out in the 1922 
State Department memorandum: they focused on (1) treaties, 
(2) congressional-executive agreements, and (3) presidential 
agreements.30 
Unlike the memorandum, McDougal and Lans staked out 
bold constitutional claims. Drawing on historical practice, they 
argued that congressional-executive agreements were constitu-
tionally permissible substitutes for treaties in all contexts.31 In 
making this argument, they equated congressional-executive 
agreements that Congress authorized before their negotiation 
and ones that Congress approved after their negotiation. (Today, 
we refer to these as ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
and ex post congressional-executive agreements, respectively.) 
Aggregating these types of agreements strengthened McDougal 
and Lans’s constitutional argument, as it enabled them to cite to 
more cumulative historical practice.32 McDougal and Lans also 
defended expansive presidential authority to make presidential 
agreements, although they did not claim that this authority 
reached as far as the other two categories.33 Throughout, they con-
sidered only the constitutionality of these various pathways and 
indeed firmly disclaimed any connection between these alterna-
tives and international law.34 
Reading McDougal and Lans in some ways shows just how 
little foreign relations law scholarship has changed over the 
years. The three categories used by McDougal and Lans have be-
come “Lesson I of Foreign Relations Law 101,” with the slight up-
date that presidential agreements are now more commonly called 
“sole executive agreements.”35 Scholarship considering these 
pathways continues to focus on their constitutional dimensions. 
 
Charter was ultimately approved as a treaty, but some other major agreements in the 
years after World War II were done as congressional-executive agreements. Id at 889–96. 
 30 McDougal and Lans, 54 Yale L J at 187, 203–06 (cited in note 29) (also briefly 
noting the additional category of agreements based on authorizations in existing treaties). 
 31 Id at 187. 
 32 See Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 868–69 (cited in note 16) (noting the 
use of this technique by defenders of interchangeability). 
 33 McDougal and Lans, 54 Yale L J at 187 (cited in note 29) (arguing that the presi-
dent has authority to make international agreements that are “within the scope of his own 
constitutional powers”). 
 34 Id at 197 (“Whatever distinction there is between treaties and executive agree-
ments must be found, not in the practices and doctrines of international law, but in our 
own unique constitutional law.”). 
 35 Koh, 101 Georgetown L J at 726 (cited in note 14). 
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As to congressional-executive agreements, scholars are still de-
bating the extent to which they are constitutionally interchange-
able with treaties. Professors Bruce Ackerman, David Golove, 
Oona Hathaway, Peter Spiro, Laurence Tribe, and others have 
all written on this topic, reaching a range of conclusions about 
interchangeability.36 
As to sole executive agreements, their meaning and their 
reach has assumed increased importance in this era of high con-
gressional gridlock and presidential unilateralism. Should we 
classify international agreements for which there are some sig-
nals of congressional support for the aims of these agreements as 
sole executive agreements or instead as something more nu-
anced? Can the executive branch commit the United States to any 
kind of international agreement? Or is the reach of sole executive 
agreements constitutionally limited in one or more of the magni-
tude, duration, or subject matter of the agreement? President 
Obama’s willingness to make important international agree-
ments without explicit authorization from the Senate or Congress 
fueled an intense constitutional conversation in both Congress 
and the academy.37 
A particularly important issue for sole executive agreements 
is their implementation. Supreme Court precedent establishes 
that sole executive agreements relating to claims settlement can 
be enforceable domestic law for purposes of the Supremacy 
Clause.38 For the most part, however, the president needs 
Congress in order to create domestic law. This constitutional limit 
is important—functionally the most important domestic legal 
limit on the scope of sole executive agreements. But as discussed 
later in this Part, preexisting congressional delegations to the 
president or to administrative agencies place considerable power 
 
 36 See generally, for example, Hathaway, 117 Yale L J 1236 (cited in note 16); Spiro, 
79 Tex L Rev 961 (cited in note 16); Golove, 73 NYU L Rev 1791 (cited in note 16); Tribe, 
108 Harv L Rev 1221 (cited in note 16); Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev 799 (cited 
in note 16). 
 37 For congressional hearings addressing this question, see note 224. For recent ar-
ticles, see generally, for example, Daniel Bodansky and Peter Spiro, Executive Agree-
ments+, 49 Vand J Transnatl L 885 (2016); Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the 
Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57 Harv Intl L J 
455 (2016); David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A 
Binding International Agreement without the Senate or Congress?, 39 Harv Envir L Rev 
515 (2015); Oona A. Hathaway and Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counter-
feiting Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement (ASIL Insights, Aug 24, 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/7TWW-6X4G. 
 38 See United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937). 
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in the hands of the executive branch, which can be used to imple-
ment carefully crafted international agreements that lack specific 
congressional authorization. 
The constitutional reach of congressional-executive agree-
ments and sole executive agreements are important issues in for-
eign relations law—yet these categories and the constitutional 
questions they evoke only partly explain how the United States 
participates in international commitments. These categories do 
not, for example, encompass nonbinding commitments, which are 
a major way in which the United States conducts diplomacy. Nor 
do these categories explain how decision-making occurs within 
the executive branch between the president, executive branch 
agencies, and independent agencies with respect to international 
commitments. The US government functions very differently in 
2016 from how it did in 1922 or in 1945, yet foreign relations law 
scholarship still tends to treat the executive branch as equivalent 
to the president. As Professor Koh put it recently, “[w]e need a 
better way to describe the texture of the tapestry of modern inter-
national lawmaking and related activities that stays truer to re-
ality than this procrustean construct” of treaties, congressional-
executive agreements, and sole executive agreements.39 Such a 
description must look beyond constitutional law. 
B. International Law 
“Fragmented,” “multi-hub,” “transnational,” and “plural-
ist”—these are words that scholars use to describe today’s inter-
national legal order.40 It has changed radically since World 
War II. The UN Charter has come into being, with its focus on 
peace, and it remains at the core of the international legal system. 
But it is only a piece of the web of international legal regimes that 
have emerged in the last sixty years and especially since the end 
 
 39 Koh, 101 Georgetown L J at 726–27 (cited in note 14). See also Harold Hongju Koh, 
Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 
126 Yale L J F 338, 345–49 (2017) (proposing a three-factor test for evaluating whether 
international commitments have been joined in a constitutionally appropriate manner). 
 40 See, for example, Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden J Intl L 553, 556 (2002) (fragmented); Paul 
Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders 10–14 
(Cambridge 2012) (pluralist); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: 
Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 Harv Intl L J 1, 5 (2015) (multi-
hub). “Transnational” has the oldest pedigree. See Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law 2 
(Yale 1956). 
 
2017] From Treaties to International Commitments 1689 
 
of the Cold War. Separate multilateral agreements and institu-
tional structures exist with regard to trade, finance, disarma-
ment, humanitarian law, the environment, and human-rights 
law, in addition to countless regional and bilateral arrangements. 
In addition to these various fora of cooperation among nations, 
the international legal order increasingly encompasses participa-
tion by nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and subna-
tional governmental entities. 
Foreign relations law scholarship rarely considers the mod-
ern structure of the international legal system in thinking about 
the pathways by which the United States joins international com-
mitments. When international law comes up at all in the context 
of the pathways, it is usually with regard to whether a now-
eroded distinction between “treaties” and “agreements” found in 
the work of the eighteenth-century international legal scholar 
Emmerich de Vattel sheds light on the constitutional scope of 
treaties as opposed to congressional-executive agreements and 
sole executive agreements.41 This minimal use of international 
law is consistent with the constitutional-law perspective that 
dominates the field. 
The architecture of the international legal order nonetheless 
plays a vital role in shaping how the United States joins interna-
tional commitments. As a formal matter, international law has 
little to say regarding the constitutional pathways by which the 
United States enters into international agreements.42 In practice, 
however, the superstructure of international law affects the form 
of international commitments, the identity of governmental ac-
tors who participate in them, and the fora within which they are 
made. These factors in turn influence the internal pathways that 
are available to and used by the United States. 
 
 41 See, for example, Bradley, International Law at 91 (cited in note 11); Golove, 73 
NYU L Rev at 1900–13 & n 36 (cited in note 16); Clark, 93 Va L Rev at 1592–93 (cited in 
note 16). 
 42 Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is now widely 
regarded as embodying customary international law, heads of state and other properly 
authorized national representatives have the capacity to represent their nations “for the 
purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty.” Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties Art 7, 1155 UNTS 331, 334, TIAS No 18232 (May 23, 1969, entered 
into force Jan 27, 1980) (“Vienna Convention”). Moreover, a nation “may not invoke the 
fact that its consent to be bound by [an international agreement] has been expressed in 
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude [international 
agreements] as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned 
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.” Vienna Convention Art 46, 1155 
UNTS at 343. 
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One important feature of the international legal order is the 
place that it accords to soft-law commitments: formal political un-
dertakings that are not binding under international law. These 
commitments can be onetime affairs, such as the Iran nuclear 
deal reached during the Obama administration. They can also be 
made under the auspices of long-standing institutional struc-
tures, such as the food safety standards developed through the 
Codex Alimentarius.43 Such soft-law commitments have largely 
been overlooked by foreign relations law scholars, even though 
they have now been around for quite some time.44 Because they 
do not impose any international legal obligations on nations, they 
are not treaties, congressional-executive agreements, or sole ex-
ecutive agreements and are thus largely invisible from a 
constitutional-law perspective.45 Yet because they are a permissi-
ble way within the international legal order of doing business—
including very important business—they have become an im-
portant way in which the United States engages in international 
cooperation. 
The rising pluralism of the international legal system also 
opens the door to participation by a variety of domestic legal ac-
tors. Although the text of the Constitution bars US states from 
making binding international agreements without the consent of 
Congress,46 in practice states have come to engage in considerable 
cooperation with foreign nations and subnational entities.47 A re-
cent example is California’s highly formalized arrangement with 
Quebec to integrate their respective cap-and-trade programs for 
greenhouse gases.48 Even looking within the US national 
 
 43 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 769 (cited in note 7). 
 44 For exceptions, see generally Duncan B. Hollis and Joshua J. Newcomer, “Politi-
cal” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 Va J Intl L 507 (2009) (considering soft-law 
commitments from the perspective of constitutional law); Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell 
L Rev 735 (cited in note 7) (analyzing how soft-law agreements engage with principles of 
both foreign relations law and administrative law). Following the Iran deal, this is begin-
ning to change. See generally, for example, Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty 
Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L Rev 371 (2016). 
 45 Hollis and Newcomer, 49 Va J Intl L at 512 (cited in note 44). 
 46 See US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation.”). See also US Const Art I, § 10, cl 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent 
of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power.”). 
 47 See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 Tex L Rev 741, 747–59 
(2010) (describing this growing phenomenon and explaining how changes in the interna-
tional legal structure have facilitated it). 
 48 Agreement between the California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du 
Québec concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for 
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government, international cooperation is increasingly carried out 
by actors outside the State Department and the White House, in-
cluding at times by leaders of independent agencies. The struc-
ture of international institutions—especially soft-law ones—facil-
itates this actuality. By way of example, because the Basel 
Committee is in essence a meeting of international bankers, US 
participation there is led by the Federal Reserve Board, with the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and even the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York also participating.49 
International institutions also shape and stabilize the inter-
national processes for making international agreements in ways 
that can influence the domestic pathways for joining these agree-
ments. Sometimes an international agreement itself spells out 
the future process, like the way that the UN Charter gives the 
Security Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.”50 Other times, international 
practice establishes patterns that serve as strong defaults. Major 
environmental commitments tend to take the form of multilat-
eral, internationally binding agreements tailored to specific envi-
ronmental issues;51 international investment commitments rest 
either in bilateral agreements or as part of regional trade pacts;52 
and so on. As discussed in the next Section, the administrative 
process by which the State Department determines the pathway 
by which the United States will join an agreement in turn takes 
account of these patterns. 
C. Administrative Law 
A third strand of law that affects how the United States en-
ters into international commitments is administrative law.53 Ex-
ecutive branch agencies and independent agencies play crucial 
 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/SJ3A 
-8ZAU. The structure of this document very much resembles a classic international-law 
agreement, complete with twenty articles, an entry-into-force provision, and a termination 
provision. 
 49 See Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View 
from Basel, 17 Eur J Intl L 15, 32–33 (2006). 
 50 UN Charter Art 24(1). 
 51 See Dan Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey, International Environmental 
Law: Mapping the Field, in Dan Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law 1, 20 (Oxford 2007). 
 52 Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U Pa L Rev 995, 998, 1057–68 (2012). 
 53 As the discussion of “administrative law” in this Section indicates, this Article uses 
the term capaciously, including within its broad ambit transsubstantive statutes like the 
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roles in the negotiation and implementation of international com-
mitments, often but not solely due to congressional delegations of 
authority. In the process, principles of regularity, accountability, 
and transparency have come to play an increased role both in the 
making of international commitments and in decisions about the 
pathways by which these commitments shall be made. 
The constitutional focus of foreign relations law tends to lead 
to equation of the president and the executive branch.54 In her 
important article on presidential power in the making of interna-
tional agreements, for example, Hathaway concludes that there 
were almost four thousand “international agreements entered by 
the President acting alone” between 1980 and 2000.55 This de-
scription of the “President acting alone” is understandable from a 
constitutional perspective. Practically speaking, however, the 
president could not have personally negotiated (or likely even 
known about) most of these agreements—instead, they would 
have been done by agencies.56 
Executive branch agencies owe strong allegiance to the pres-
ident, both legally and functionally. Their leaders are appointed 
by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, can 
be removed by him or her, and are subject to various forms of 
White House supervision, especially for important matters. More-
over, they are more likely in the foreign affairs context than in 
the domestic context to be exercising delegated presidential pow-
ers, including the power to conduct international negotiations 
and the commander-in-chief power. This is especially true of the 
 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various 
sections of Title 5, specific statutes applicable to agency action, and internal executive 
branch processes that are designed to further regularity, accountability, and transpar-
ency—all of which have implications for institutional dynamics within the executive 
branch. 
 54 The literature unpacking the executive branch is more robust in relation to na-
tional security. See, for example, Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: 
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2319–42 
(2006) (considering intra–executive branch checks with a particular focus on the post-
9/11 landscape). 
 55 Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Bal-
ance, 119 Yale L J 140, 152–53 (2009) (including both ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements and sole executive agreements in this tally). 
 56 Indeed, some of the statutes that Hathaway identifies as delegating power to make 
these agreements do not delegate power to the president but rather to cabinet officials or 
other agency heads. See id at 159–65 (providing a list of statutes, some of which delegate 
authority to the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the administrator of the US 
Agency for International Development, and “[t]he Postal Service, with the consent of the 
President”). 
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Departments of State and Defense, but other executive branch 
agencies can channel these powers, as well. 
But the loyalties of executive branch agencies are nonethe-
less divided. They are of course answerable to Congress as well as 
the president. Sometimes Congress has passed laws that 
explicitly relate to how agencies will participate in international 
negotiations—for example, Congress requires the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to publish an annual notice describ-
ing intended US participation in standard setting done by the 
Codex Alimentarius and to provide an opportunity for public com-
ment on this issue.57 In addition, the implementation of many in-
ternational commitments—especially ones with a regulatory com-
ponent—depends on the domestic legal powers that Congress has 
delegated to these agencies. To continue with this example, the 
FDA implements decisions of the Codex Alimentarius through its 
preexisting powers under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.58 Fi-
nally, at a general level, the agencies are answerable to Congress 
because their budgets come from Congress. To the extent that 
they focus on presidential interests at the expense of congres-
sional ones, they may face not only congressional complaints, in-
quiries, and hearings, but also threats to their bottom line. In 
a 2016 hearing on the Paris Agreement, for example, one wit-
ness encouraged Congress to use its appropriations power to 
block the EPA from expending any funds that might implement 
the Agreement.59 In addition to Congress, agencies are also 
strongly responsive to the interests of their own civil servants and 
to various outside constituencies.60 
The distinction between the president and executive 
branch agencies with respect to international commitments is 
demonstrated by efforts by the president to supervise agency ac-
tions in this context. For international agreements, a federal reg-
ulation provides that “[t]he Secretary of State is responsible, on 
 
 57 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 491, Pub L No 103-465, 108 Stat 4809, 4970–
71 (1994). 
 58 52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq. 
 59 House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 54 (cited 
in note 17) (testimony of Steven Groves of The Heritage Foundation’s Freedom Project). 
For an example of how Congress can use its power to influence agency participation in 
ongoing negotiations within an international institution, see Kristina Daugirdas, Congress 
Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 Am J Intl L 517, 537–39 (2013) (describ-
ing how Congress used its appropriations power to pressure the Department of the 
Treasury to advocate for certain policies within the World Bank). 
 60 See, for example, Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 
115 Colum L Rev 515, 530–51 (2015). 
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behalf of the President, for ensuring that all proposed interna-
tional agreements of the United States are fully consistent with 
United States foreign policy objectives.”61 Agencies must receive 
the State Department’s permission to negotiate them and must 
clear the final texts with the State Department prior to signa-
ture.62 There used to be no parallel for nonbinding commitments, 
but in 2012 Obama issued Executive Order 13609 on Promoting 
International Regulatory Cooperation, which sets up procedures 
for furthering interagency cooperation with respect to “interna-
tional regulatory cooperation activities that are reasonably an-
ticipated to lead to significant regulatory actions.”63 This coordi-
nation is to run through a Regulatory Working Group chaired by 
the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
within the White House.64 
As all this suggests, the making of international commit-
ments is a ripe venue for the same kind of institutional dynamics 
that play out in domestic administrative law. The president holds 
the reins, and yet the agencies have considerable power to shape 
their own agendas. They also have tools to resist presidential 
oversight. Professor Jennifer Nou’s work describes how, in the do-
mestic rulemaking context, agencies can deploy techniques that 
“functionally serve to bypass [presidential] review, calibrate its 
scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available” for it.65 Such 
ability of federal agencies to evade or resist presidential power 
serves as a practical check on the reach of that power. Similar 
 
 61 22 CFR § 181.4(a). Presidential control here thus runs through the State 
Department, which may use its power in ways that further a particular vision of the pres-
ident’s agenda. Nonetheless, as a matter of constitutional law, the State Department is 
acting here as the agent of the president. Functionally, its decisions are especially likely 
to reflect presidential preferences for international agreements that are important enough 
to attract the personal involvement of the president. 
 62 This is part of the C-175 Procedure, see notes 69–73 and accompanying text, which 
goes back to the 1950s. Interestingly, it is also promoted by Congress under the Case-
Zablocki Act, Pub L No 92-403, 86 Stat 619 (1972), codified as amended at 1 USC § 112b 
(providing that no international agreement may be signed “without prior consultation with 
the Secretary of State”). 
 63 Executive Order 13609 § 2(a) (2013), 3 CFR 255, 255–56. Agencies must report 
their intent to engage in such cooperative activities in their Regulatory Plan, which is 
made public annually. Executive Order 13609 § 3(a), 3 CFR at 256 (cross-referencing Ex-
ecutive Order 12866). See also Executive Order 12866 § 4(c)(7) (1994), 3 CFR 638, 643 
(providing that the Regulatory Plans shall be published each October). 
 64 Executive Order 13609 § 2, 3 CFR at 255–56. 
 65 Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 Harv L Rev 
1755, 1764 (2013). 
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tools will presumably be available for international regulatory co-
ordination, especially when it will ultimately result in domestic 
rulemaking.66 Finally, also as in the domestic legal context, inde-
pendent regulatory agencies have even more room to maneuver 
with respect to international commitments than do executive 
branch agencies67—as illustrated by the Federal Reserve’s power-
ful role in the negotiation and implementation of Basel III. In-
deed, Professors Peter Conti-Brown and David Zaring observe 
that often “the Fed sets its own foreign policy,” sometimes amidst 
disagreement from executive branch agencies.68 
The influence of administrative law on the making of inter-
national commitments can be found not only with respect to in-
stitutional dynamics but also with respect to underlying values of 
procedural regularity and reasoned decision-making. The very 
process by which the executive branch decides how to join an in-
ternational commitment is designed to promote these values. To 
decide whether an international agreement should be made as a 
treaty, a congressional-executive agreement, or a sole executive 
agreement, the State Department engages in what is known as 
the “Circular 175 Procedure”—a process set out in the State 
Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual69 and complemented by 
provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations.70 The C-175 
Procedure sets forth eight factors that State Department lawyers 
should consider in determining the appropriate pathway for an 
international agreement.71 These factors relate to constitutional 
 
 66 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 769 n 168 (cited in note 7) (consid-
ering how the techniques described by Nou could play out with respect to nonbinding in-
ternational commitments). 
 67 For example, independent regulatory agencies are simply “encouraged to comply” 
with the provisions of Executive Order 13609, unlike other agencies that are required to 
do so. See Executive Order 13609 §§ 4(a), 5, 3 CFR at 257. 
 68 Peter Conti-Brown and David Zaring, Foreign Affairs and the Federal Reserve *4, 
6–7 (unpublished draft on file with author). 
 69 US Department of State, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual §§ 720–27, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/J6UY-DBPP (“11 FAM”). 
 70 22 CFR § 181. 
 71 11 FAM § 723.3 (cited in note 69). The eight factors are: 
(1) [t]he extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting 
the nation as a whole; (2) [w]hether the agreement is intended to affect state 
laws; (3) [w]hether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of 
subsequent legislation by the Congress; (4) [p]ast U.S. practice as to similar 
agreements; (5) [t]he preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agree-
ment; (6) [t]he degree of formality desired for an agreement; (7) [t]he proposed 
duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an agreement, and 
 
1696  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:1675 
   
concerns, to the international context in which the agreement was 
reached, and to various practical considerations. For example, the 
factor of “[p]ast U.S. practice as to similar agreements” is tied to 
both international law and constitutional law, as the interna-
tional legal context helps determine what constitutes a “similar 
agreement” and past practice is relevant for assessing constitu-
tional concerns. The C-175 Procedure also provides for consulta-
tion with congressional leaders and committees “as may be appro-
priate” when there is debate about whether or not an agreement 
should be done as a treaty.72 
Administrative-law principles also infuse other aspects of the 
commitment-making process. The C-175 Procedure calls on the 
negotiators of international agreements to create an opportunity 
for public comment whenever, in the view of the State Department, 
“circumstances permit.”73 With regard to nonbinding interna-
tional commitments, Congress sometimes similarly insists that 
agencies provide an opportunity in the course of negotiations for 
notice and comment.74 In addition, in the Case-Zablocki Act,75 
Congress required that all international agreements other than 
treaties be submitted to Congress within sixty days of their entry 
into force.76 Finally, when administrative agencies rely on con-
gressionally delegated authority in implementing international 
commitments into domestic law, their actions will be subject to 
the Administrative Procedure Act77 (APA) and whatever adminis-
trative procedures are set forth in the legislation from which their 
delegated authority stems. 
Administrative-law principles thus pervade the making of in-
ternational commitments. But it is important to acknowledge 
that they often do so in weaker ways than in many domestic legal 
contexts. For one thing, administrative agencies engaged in the 
making of international commitments can invoke various limits 
 
the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement; and (8) [t]he 
general international practice as to similar agreements. 
 72 11 FAM § 723.4 (cited in note 69). 
 73 11 FAM §§ 722(5), 725.1(6) (cited in note 69). 
 74 See note 57 and accompanying text. 
 75 Pub L No 92-403, 86 Stat 619 (1972), codified as amended at 1 USC § 112b. 
 76 See Case-Zablocki Act § 1, 86 Stat at 619, 1 USC § 112b(a) (further limiting the 
reporting of agreements “the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion 
of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States”). The C-175 
Procedure also provides that “unless classified, [international agreements] generally are 
published by the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs” some time fol-
lowing their entry into force. 11 FAM § 725.3(a) (cited in note 69). 
 77 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
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or exceptions that reduce transparency and public participa-
tion. The APA exempts various foreign affairs–related issues 
from notice-and-comment rulemaking,78 and the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Government in the Sunshine Act79 narrowly 
when it comes to the participation of US agency leaders in inter-
national negotiations.80 For another thing, the executive branch 
maintains a veil over how it decides whether to push for binding 
versus nonbinding commitments and over how the C-175 
Procedure is applied to particular agreements. Thus, the State 
Department does not typically publish or otherwise disclose its 
legal reasoning with respect to the C-175 factors (and therefore 
provides no opportunity for public comment on this reasoning). 
Overall, while the constraints of administrative law with respect 
to international commitments can be less extensive than the con-
straints created by administrative law in traditional domestic 
contexts, they are still considerable. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE  
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The rise of multiple pathways to making international com-
mitments has fundamentally reshaped the separation of powers 
with respect to them. In the years since the Founding, the execu-
tive branch has gained a new and crucial power—the power of 
choice. The executive branch selects the pathway by which the 
United States will join an international commitment. In constitu-
tional terms, this gives the president the opportunity to bypass 
the Senate and often Congress, and thus to evade the traditional 
constraints on presidential overreaching. Yet with this oppor-
tunity come new checks rooted in both international law and ad-
ministrative law. The more the president chooses to bypass the 
Senate and Congress, the stronger these checks are likely to be. 
Overall, the rise of multiple pathways has led to a structural shift 
away from a single, concentrated check on presidential power to 
a set of checks that are individually diffuse but collectively strong. 
 
 78 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 775–77 (cited in note 7); 5 USC 
§ 553(a)(1) (exempting a “military or foreign affairs function of the United States” from 
notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 79 Pub L No 94-409, 90 Stat 1241 (1976), codified in various sections of Title 5. 
 80 Federal Communications Commission v ITT World Communications, Inc, 466 US 
463, 473 (1984) (holding that the international negotiation at issue was not a meeting “of 
an agency” for purposes of the Government in the Sunshine Act because the FCC did not 
convene this negotiation and did not have unilateral control over its procedures). 
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These checks are spread across all three stages of the commit-
ment-making process: negotiation, domestic approval, and imple-
mentation. Not all the checks described here are present for every 
international commitment—there is considerable variation 
across particular commitments—but most commitments are sub-
ject to a robust set of checks. This Part describes this structural 
shift and connects it to broader trends with respect to the separa-
tion of powers. 
A. The President’s Power to Choose 
From a constitutional perspective, the rise of alternatives to 
the Treaty Clause has greatly enhanced the president’s powers. 
With these alternatives, the president has gained not only the 
substantive power to make at least certain types of agreements 
under his or her own authority, but also the procedural power to 
choose the pathway by which an international commitment will 
be approved. This power to choose is immensely important. Given 
all the constitutionally defensible alternative pathways available 
today, the president can almost always pursue an approach that 
bypasses the subsequent approval of the Senate and Congress. 
Historical practice firmly establishes the president’s author-
ity to choose the pathway by which an international commitment 
will be approved.81 Of course, the president may pick only a path-
way that is constitutionally justifiable. But in choosing a path-
way, the president can simultaneously widen it. As such choices 
have accumulated through historical practice over time, they 
have made these alternative pathways increasingly defensible as 
a matter of constitutional law.82 Today, the president always has 
the following three options: (1) for agreements that are binding as 
a matter of international law, to go to the Senate for approval 
pursuant to the Treaty Clause; (2) for any commitments dealing 
 
 81 This approach is currently embodied in the C-175 Procedure, discussed in notes 
69–73 and accompanying text, in which, as a constitutional matter, the State Department 
acts as the agent of the president. Congress has not to date sought to dictate the choice of 
pathway (although the Case-Zablocki Act sets out procedural requirements related to this 
choice), and the extent to which it could do so is an interesting constitutional question. See 
note 236 (discussing a “sense of the Senate” resolution in 1969 on this issue). Sometimes 
in the course of obtaining advice and consent for treaties, the executive branch makes 
explicit commitments with regard to the path that will be pursued with respect to future, 
related agreements. 
 82 See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 
Va L Rev 987, 1027–33 (2013) (discussing sole executive agreements); Curtis A. Bradley 
and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 
411, 468–76 (2012) (discussing congressional-executive agreements). 
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with issues within the scope of Congress’s Article I powers, to go 
to Congress for its approval following their negotiation; or (3) for 
commitments that are nonbinding as a matter of international 
law, to approve them under his or her own authority.83 In addi-
tion, the president has a fourth option for at least many interna-
tional agreements, which is to approve them without any post-
negotiation action by the Senate or Congress. The constitutional 
basis for this last option is one or more of a prior congressional 
authorization, a prior authorization set out in a treaty, prior leg-
islation that implicitly supports the president’s action, or the 
president’s independent constitutional powers.84 
This power to choose gives the president the ability to side-
step the check of legislative approval. Especially for important 
agreements, this raises structural constitutional concerns. As 
Professor Louis Henkin put it, the “highly uncertain” “reaches of 
the President’s power to make executive agreements . . . might 
tempt activist Presidents into far-reaching undertakings.”85 If go-
ing to the Senate or to Congress for specific approval is only op-
tional for the president, then there are few if any meaningful con-
stitutional checks on the process of approving domestic 
commitments. 
Following the Obama administration’s strategic use of the 
president’s power to choose, this concern has received significant 
attention. “Expanded use of sole executive agreements . . . re-
duces democratic control over international lawmaking . . . [and] 
raises serious questions about the potential of these agreements 
to undermine democratic lawmaking writ large,” write Profes-
sors Hathaway and Amy Kapcyzynski with regard to the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement86 (ACTA).87 In a similar vein, 
Professor Michael Ramsey considers that the “aggressive ap-
proach” taken by the Obama administration with regard to the 
 
 83 See Part I.A. Constitutional law provides enough support for these options for the 
president to proceed with them in the first instance. It is theoretically possible but, in my 
view, highly unlikely that a court might one day find an exercise of one of these options 
unconstitutional. See, for example, Made in the USA Foundation v United States, 242 F3d 
1300, 1319–20 (11th Cir 2001) (finding the question whether NAFTA was appropriately 
done as a congressional-executive agreement to be a “nonjusticiable political question”). 
 84 See Part I.A. 
 85 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 224 (cited in note 11). 
 86 50 ILM 239 (2011). 
 87 Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37). ACTA “establishes 
new norms across a range of intellectual property rights, with an emphasis on heightened 
penalties, more summary proceedings, more extensive border enforcement, and the intro-
duction of obligations for third parties.” Id. 
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Iran deal and the Paris Agreement “threatens to evade the lim-
itations on the President imposed by the treaty making 
power.”88 In Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary Task 
Force on Executive Overreach held a hearing on this very issue.89 
The president’s power to choose does indeed weaken the core 
constitutional constraint on international commitments. Yet this 
does not translate into a straightforward increase in presidential 
power. When we take into account other bodies of law, other in-
stitutional actors, and other stages of the commitment-making 
process, the picture is far more complex and constrained. As the 
analysis below shows, the president’s power of choice is not the 
power to avoid constraints entirely. Rather, it is the power to 
choose between different types of constraints. 
B. Diffuse Checks, Collective Balance 
Checks on presidential power do exist under the myriad path-
ways for making international commitments, but they look very 
little like the check built into the original constitutional design. 
The Treaty Clause provides a single, concentrated constitutional 
check on presidential overreach. At its core, this check is 
grounded in one institution (the Senate), tied to one stage of the 
commitment-making process (domestic approval), and mani-
fested in one type of activity (a supermajority vote).90 By contrast, 
the various pathways for making international commitments 
have given rise to a set of checks which are spread out across in-
stitutions, across phases of the commitment-making process, and 
across types of activities. These checks stem from international 
law and administrative law as well as from constitutional law. 
Collectively they serve as robust structural safeguards on presi-
dential power. 
While some of these checks are independent, others are 
closely interconnected. These relationships can be seen by looking 
 
 88 Ramsey, 11 FIU L Rev at 387 (cited in note 44). 
 89 See generally House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 
(cited in note 17). 
 90 It isn’t quite this simple; hence the qualifier “at its core.” See Jean Galbraith, Con-
gress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 59, 83–93 
(2014) (discussing how the implementation of some treaties has come through practice to 
depend on the passage of further legislation by Congress); Jean Galbraith, Prospective 
Advice and Consent, 37 Yale J Intl L 247, 251–74, 285 (2012) (discussing how the Senate 
has on rare occasions used its advice-and-consent power at the negotiating stage and also 
noting how the Senate’s internal procedures enhance the already-high bar of the super-
majority voting requirement). 
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separately at the three phases of the commitment-making pro-
cess: negotiation, domestic approval, and implementation. As a 
general rule of thumb, the more the president wishes to duck the 
need for approval from the Senate or Congress, the more limits 
he or she must accept with respect to the negotiation and imple-
mentation of the commitments. 
1. Negotiation. 
International negotiations have always come with the practi-
cal limit that it takes at least two to tango. In today’s world, these 
negotiations also take place against the backdrop of a well-
developed international legal order. The president and his or her 
agents are bound structurally and substantively in negotiations 
by this international legal order, even as they also face domestic 
legal constraints imposed by the future need for domestic ap-
proval and implementation of any negotiated agreement. 
International law is no longer in an era of creation like that 
following the end of World War II or, later, the end of the Cold 
War. Substantively, major multilateral agreements already ad-
dress most areas of international concern, and their foundational 
legal principles cannot realistically be revisited. Structurally, 
these agreements also have created institutions through which 
future negotiations are channeled—for example, worldwide trade 
negotiations are held under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization, and worldwide security or human-rights negotia-
tions go through the United Nations. This thick existing frame-
work limits what the president and his or her agents can pursue 
in worldwide negotiations. It does not make new worldwide agree-
ments impossible, but it does notably “condition[ ] the traditional 
use of state power,” including by bringing formalized procedures and 
often some level of transparency of process into the negotiations.91 
The existing international legal structure also limits what 
can be done through nonbinding commitments and through bilat-
eral or regional agreements. In negotiating these commitments, 
executive branch officials likely confront fewer procedural limits 
on the negotiating process but more substantive limits set by 
preexisting international law. Even modest commitments that 
the president probably knows little or nothing about need to be 
 
 91 Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 213, 227 (2002) 
(describing how existing treaty regimes limit the traditional diplomatic powers of powerful 
states). 
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negotiated with an eye to the broader international superstruc-
ture. Bilateral fisheries agreements, for example, are structured 
to ensure “consisten[cy] with international law.”92 For major com-
mitments, this need is even more acute. The terms of the Iran 
deal, for example, had to be carefully negotiated in light of the 
existing international legal backdrop. Among other things, be-
cause these terms dealt with sanctions previously imposed by the 
UN Security Council, the negotiators had to make sure that the 
deal would be one that the Security Council would accept and em-
brace through the passage of a subsequent resolution.93 
Turning to the domestic legal backdrop, the president’s power 
to negotiate seems all-encompassing at first. As a matter of con-
stitutional law, the classic statement is that “the President alone 
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. 
. . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”94 But even accepting 
these lines as formally correct—and the Supreme Court has re-
cently sent mixed signals on that front95—they do not reflect the 
practical realities that stem from institutional design and from 
shadow-of-the-law effects related to approval and implementa-
tion. In practice, these leave the president limited in terms of both 
his or her control over the negotiations and the substance of ne-
gotiating terms. 
If the president will need the Senate to approve a treaty or 
Congress to approve an ex post congressional-executive agree-
ment, then as a practical matter the president needs to solicit con-
gressional input during the negotiating process. This happens in-
formally and also in certain formal ways. In relation to treaties, 
the Senate sometimes passes resolutions requesting that the 
president undertake certain negotiations or seek certain terms.96 
 
 92 See, for example, Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada on Fisheries Enforcement, TIAS No 11753 (Sept 
26, 1990, entered into force Dec 16, 1991) (further referencing various aspects of the law 
of the sea). 
 93 See Jean Galbraith, Comment, Ending Security Council Resolutions, 109 Am J 
Intl L 806, 807–10 (2015) (describing the interconnections between the Iran deal and a 
subsequent Security Council resolution approving it). 
 94 United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 319 (1936). 
 95 See Zivotofsky v Kerry, 135 S Ct 2076, 2086, 2089–90 (2015) (signaling some dis-
approval of this language yet simultaneously affirming that the president “has the sole 
power to negotiate treaties”). 
 96 See Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 251–52, 303–04 (cited in note 90) (describing the 
Senate’s resolution during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations that the United States should 
not sign any treaties that committed itself to limiting greenhouse gas emissions unless 
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In relation to trade agreements, Congress has over the years 
passed “fast-track” statutes that give the president an expedited 
route to an ex post floor vote if the president pursues certain ne-
gotiating objectives and involves members of Congress in the ne-
gotiations in certain formalized ways.97 And even when they are 
not asked for their views, members of Congress can find ways to 
weigh in—as with the letter sent by Senator Tom Cotton and nu-
merous other senators to Iranian leaders during the negotiations 
of the Iran deal.98 
A more overlooked but comparably important way in which 
the president must share negotiating power stems from the role 
of administrative agencies. The president depends on agencies to 
carry out most international negotiations. The routine small-scale 
negotiations that make up the vast majority of international com-
mitments are less exercises of presidential power than of bureau-
cratic power over which the president keeps a supervisory eye 
through his or her agents in the State Department and the White 
House. And even major negotiations can occur with relatively lit-
tle oversight from the president. The increased use of nonbinding 
political commitments has increased the president’s power to by-
pass the Senate and Congress, but it has also increased the power 
of agencies and US states to negotiate in the foreign affairs space 
with relatively little presidential oversight.99 In addition to the 
example of Basel III, international regulatory coordination with 
respect to insurance policy is currently carried out through coop-
erative efforts between US states and various federal agencies, 
including the Federal Insurance Office, an office within the 
Treasury Department created by Congress for this purpose in the 
Dodd-Frank Act.100 
 
developing counties similarly bound themselves and the treaty would not seriously harm 
the US economy). 
 97 For an overview, see generally Ian F. Fergusson, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy (Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/PQH4-9CW3. 
 98  Tom Cotton, et al, Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar 
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KZ73-5UX7. For a detailed picture drawn from 
Wikileaks data of the direct diplomatic activities of members of Congress, see Ryan M. 
Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 Mich L Rev 331, 336–56 (2013). 
 99 For elaboration of this point with respect to the Federal Reserve, see generally 
Conti-Brown and Zaring, Foreign Affairs and the Federal Reserve (cited in note 68). For 
discussion of how states make nonbinding commitments with foreign states, see Hollis, 88 
Tex L Rev at 743–44 (cited in note 47) (concluding that such commitments have become 
“remarkably common”). 
 100 See The Impact of International Regulatory Standards on the Competitiveness of 
U.S. Insurers, Part II, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance of the 
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Even when the negotiation of international commitments lies 
with the president’s traditional diplomatic agents in the State 
Department, these diplomats can have strong incentives to listen 
to agencies. Agencies can bring valuable contributions to the table 
on commitments that relate to their expertise. Even more im-
portantly, an agency will be essential to implementation as an in-
stitutional matter if the president intends to bypass subsequent 
approval by the Senate or Congress and instead implement the 
commitment by drawing on an agency’s preexisting domestic au-
thority. The negotiation of the Minamata Convention on Mercury 
is a good example. This multilateral international agreement re-
quires state parties to take specific steps to reduce the amount of 
mercury in the environment.101 The United States joined this 
agreement in 2013—the same year that its negotiation was final-
ized—without receiving the advice and consent of the Senate or 
the ex post approval of Congress.102 The State Department ex-
plained that “[t]he United States has already taken significant 
steps to reduce the amount of mercury we generate and release to 
the environment, and can implement Convention obligations un-
der existing legislative and regulatory authority.”103 To ensure 
that the United States could in fact implement the Convention in 
light of preexisting regulatory power, however, US diplomats had 
to make sure during the Convention’s negotiations that its obli-
gations would not go beyond what the United States already had 
the power to implement. These diplomats thus had to engage the 
EPA in these negotiations and rely on its understanding of its 
regulatory power under congressional statutes.104 In turn, US ne-
gotiators could credibly signal that they were constrained 
negotiators to foreign counterparts.105 
 
House Committee on Financial Services, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 6–8 (2016) (testimony of Pro-
fessor David Zaring) (describing ways in which a proposed bill in Congress would incorpo-
rate more administrative-law principles into this negotiating process). 
 101 Minamata Convention on Mercury, 55 ILM 586 (2016) (not in force). 
 102 See Duncan Hollis, Doesn’t the U.S. Senate Care about Mercury? (Opinio Juris, 
Nov 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5GHZ-3XMC. 
 103 US Department of State, United States Joins Minamata Convention on Mercury 
(Nov 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/66VU-SNSJ. 
 104 See Minamata Convention on Mercury (EPA), archived at http://perma.cc/U5LC 
-HVSY (noting that “EPA worked closely with the State Department and other federal 
agencies in the negotiation of this agreement”). 
 105 The fact that US negotiators can be domestically constrained even without the 
subsequent need for legislative approval is recognized, if less discussed, in classic work on 
international bargaining. See, for example, Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Intl Org 427, 429, 448 (1988) (giving an example 
of how the president was a constrained negotiator even though approval from the Senate 
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2. Approval. 
The choices available to the president for approval depend on 
the form and content of the negotiated agreement and on whether 
the executive branch has the preexisting power to implement it. 
This choice thus implicates issues of international law, constitu-
tional law, and administrative law. 
For commitments that are nonbinding as a matter of interna-
tional law, the president can approve them without further action 
by the Senate or Congress. In theory, this gives the president 
enormous power—so much so that scholars are beginning to urge 
that constitutional limits be read into the president’s power to ap-
prove nonbinding commitments.106 In practice, the power looks 
less overwhelming. Internationally, the use of a nonbinding com-
mitment must not only be consented to by negotiating partners 
(as with all international commitments), but will also need to be 
structured in a way that is consistent with existing international 
law because a nonbinding agreement cannot change international 
law.107 Domestically, the president may face political pressure to 
pursue a binding rather than a nonbinding agreement. Moreover, 
as discussed shortly, if the executive branch does not have the 
preexisting power to implement the commitment, it will need to 
obtain either implementing legislation from Congress or the sup-
port of US states. 
For international agreements, the president faces legal as 
well as political constraints on the power to choose. Internation-
ally, there may be political constraints imposed by negotiating 
partners, who may want the president to obtain the stronger sig-
nal of commitment embodied by a domestic pathway that includes 
the explicit approval of the Senate or Congress.108 Domestically, 
as a matter of process, decision-making with respect to the presi-
dent’s power of choice is carried out by officials in the State 
Department who are applying the C-175 Procedure. For almost 
 
and Congress was not required, although also offering other examples when such approval 
would be required). 
 106 See Hollis and Newcomer, 49 Va J Intl L at 538–75 (cited in note 44). See also 
generally Ramsey, 11 FIU L Rev 371 (cited in note 44). 
 107 See, for example, notes 219–21 and accompanying text (detailing how the presi-
dent’s negotiators could not achieve having the overall structure of the Paris Agreement 
take a nonbinding form). 
 108 See generally Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: 
Treaties as Signaling Devices, 35 Pres Stud Q 440 (2005) (arguing that the form of domes-
tic ratification serves as a signal of the strength of the US intentions in ways that other 
nations may view as significant). 
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all agreements, their decisions will presumably track existing 
practice. It is in only a few—but important—situations when 
presidential strategy will presumably come into play. Indeed, the 
practice of the Obama administration suggests the limited prac-
tical reach of the president’s power to choose the path of interna-
tional agreements. The administration has sent treaties to the 
Senate when past practice almost uniformly supports the use of 
the treaty route for a particular type of major agreement, includ-
ing the New START Treaty (which received advice and consent 
by a 71–26 vote)109 and the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (which failed by a 61–38 vote).110 Con-
sistent with both past practice and the practical need for imple-
menting legislation, the Obama administration could not join the 
TPP without congressional approval, and this agreement has 
since been abandoned by the Trump administration.111 By con-
trast, when the Obama administration signaled its intent to by-
pass the subsequent approval of the Senate or Congress despite 
substantial practice in favor of pursuing such approval, it did so 
only when (1) some plausible past practice supported its approach 
and (2) it considered that it has the preexisting authority to im-
plement these agreements. This was the case for ACTA, the 
Minamata Convention, and the Paris Agreement.112 Notably, the 
Obama administration faced considerable pushback with regard 
to the legality of its decision to bypass the Senate and Congress 
for both ACTA and the Paris Agreement.113 (The less prominent 
Minamata Convention flew mostly under the radar.) Perhaps in 
part because of this pushback, the Obama administration never 
acted on its asserted power to join the United States to ACTA, 
 
 109 Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the New START Treaty at 23472 (cited 
in note 5). 
 110 Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, 112th Cong, 2d Sess, in 158 Cong Rec 16184–85 (Dec 4, 2012). 
 111 See Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(cited in note 10); Presidential Memorandum regarding Withdrawal of the United States 
(cited in note 10). 
 112 For past practice relevant to ACTA, see Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1040–41 (cited 
in note 82). For past practice relevant to the Minamata Convention and the Paris 
Agreement, see Wirth, 39 Harv Envir L Rev at 552–61 (cited in note 37). This Article takes 
no position on whether the administration’s decision to bypass the Senate and Congress 
for the Minamata Convention stemmed from concerns about resistance to the Convention 
or instead from an interest in establishing a precedent that in turn would be useful for the 
Paris Agreement. 
 113 See Part IV (describing resistance to the administration’s choice with respect to 
the Paris Agreement). See also Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1040–41 (cited in note 82) (de-
scribing resistance to the administration’s choice with respect to the ACTA). 
 
2017] From Treaties to International Commitments 1707 
 
although it did indeed join the Paris Agreement and the 
Minamata Convention. 
3. Implementation. 
As with the negotiation and approval of international com-
mitments, there is no one-size-fits-all account of implementation. 
Instead, how a commitment is implemented depends on what the 
commitment is, how it has been approved, and what existing law 
relates to its implementation. These factors determine the scope 
of what the president can do. 
At the international level, major multilateral commitments 
often require transparency with respect to implementation. The 
Minamata Convention, for example, requires each state party to 
file reports on how it is implementing the Convention and pro-
vides certain soft oversight tools to the Conference of the Parties 
and an Implementation and Compliance Committee.114 These re-
quirements are designed to enable countries to keep an eye on 
each other, but they also provide sunshine for domestic actors 
who wish to scrutinize executive branch action with respect to the 
implementation of commitments. 
Turning to domestic law, to ensure that the United States can 
implement an international commitment, the executive branch 
will generally need one or more of the following: (1) an independ-
ent power of the president that provides for implementation, 
(2) the international commitment to receive advice and consent 
from the Senate as a treaty and/or congressional legislation im-
plementing it, or (3) the terms of the commitment to be ones that 
can be or already are implemented pursuant to preexisting 
statutes.115 Each of these categories comes with its own set of 
constraints. 
The main constraint on the president’s independent powers 
is their limited scope. The president can fulfill commitments to 
communicate with other nations, to recognize foreign nations, to 
take steps pursuant to the commander-in-chief power, and to set-
tle certain claims between US citizens and foreign states and 
 
 114 Minamata Convention on Mercury Arts 15, 21–23, 55 ILM at 599–600, 602–04. 
 115 A fourth, rarer category is a commitment whose terms will be implemented by US 
states. In a very early example of a significant nonbinding commitment, for example, Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt reached an arrangement with Japan whose terms tacitly de-
pended on Roosevelt’s ability to persuade California to improve its treatment of Japanese 
schoolchildren. See Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 Cal L Rev 633, 641–43 (2009) 
(describing the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”). 
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other foreign entities.116 Most of these powers relate to outward-
facing actions by the United States rather than to the regulation 
of the conduct of private citizens. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that, outside the context of claims settlement, the president 
has starkly limited independent power to implement an interna-
tional commitment in a way that affects the domestic legal rights 
of US states or private parties.117 
When the president seeks the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate and/or specific legislation from Congress, the check is the leg-
islative process, with all the democratic principles that it embod-
ies. For international agreements, the president will typically get 
any needed legislative authorization to implement the agreement 
simultaneously with the process of domestic approval.118 For non-
binding commitments, implementing legislation is more likely to 
postdate the approval process. For example, President George W. 
Bush made a soft-law commitment on behalf of the United States 
to stem the import of conflict diamonds and then sought and ob-
tained a specific statute to implement it.119 If there is divergence 
between the implementing legislation and the international com-
mitment, then it is the terms of the implementing legislation that 
will control within the United States.120 
As to the third category, the constraints that exist when a 
preexisting statute authorizes implementation will vary with the 
content of the statute. The broader the statute’s scope, the more 
the executive branch can use it as implementing authority. The 
more discretion the statute gives to executive branch actors, the 
more these actors can use this discretion in the service of imple-
menting an international commitment. And the fewer procedural 
 
 116 This list is exemplary rather than exclusive. For a longer discussion of the presi-
dent’s powers, see Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 31–62 (cited in note 11). 
 117 Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491, 527–32 (2008) (emphasizing that the president 
lacks the power to make domestic law and describing the claims-settlement context as 
“involv[ing] a narrow set of circumstances”). 
 118 The authority to implement treaties sometimes flows from their status as the law 
of the land (which in turn requires that they have received the Senate’s advice and consent 
and been ratified) and sometimes from implementing legislation passed by Congress, 
which in practice will typically be passed before the president ratifies the treaty. See Gal-
braith, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev at 76 & n 62 (cited in note 90). For ex post congressional-
executive agreements, in essence Congress votes simultaneously on the approval and im-
plementation of the agreement. See Fergusson, Trade Promotion Authority at *1, 10 (cited 
in note 97). 
 119 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 778–81 (cited in note 7). 
 120 See id at 786–87 (giving an example of the controlling effect of the terms of the 
implementing legislation with respect to Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act). 
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constraints the statute (and other relevant statutes) has, the eas-
ier it will be to use this statute to implement the international 
commitment. 
In practice, however, Congress does not typically pass stat-
utes with sweeping substantive reach, enormous executive 
branch discretion, and minimal procedural safeguards. Congress 
comes closest when enacting traditional foreign policy statutes, 
such as those relating to sanctions, and even these will come with 
nontrivial limits. For example, in the years prior to the Iran deal, 
Congress passed numerous statutes imposing sanctions on 
Iran.121 For the most part—but not entirely—these statutes ex-
plicitly gave the president the authority to waive these sanctions 
under certain conditions.122 Because President Obama planned to 
rely on his discretion to waive these sanctions in order to imple-
ment the core US commitments under the Iran deal, his negotia-
tors had to ensure that the deal stayed within the limits of his 
discretionary authority. To give only one example, one of the con-
gressional statutes at issue expressly authorized state and local 
governments to divest from actors owning a certain stake in Iran’s 
energy sector.123 Obama thus had to make sure that the Iran deal 
did not commit the United States to ending these divestment 
measures, as he could not have implemented such a provision.124 
Here, as in other ways with respect to the Iran deal, the limits 
attached to implementation shaped the content of the negotia-
tions. In addition, the very fact that the Iran deal relied so heavily 
on Obama’s discretionary authority in implementation leaves it 
deeply vulnerable to abandonment by his successor.125 
When the president seeks to use domestic policy statutes for 
the implementation of international commitments, he or she will 
 
 121 For a fuller and more complex picture, see Dianne E. Rennack, Iran: U.S. Eco-
nomic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions *5–32 (Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Jan 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/XLP4-2ZE6. 
 122 See id (listing the various statutes and noting the availability of waivers). 
 123 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 § 202, 
Pub L No 111-195, 124 Stat 1312, 1342–43, codified at 22 USC § 8532. 
 124 See Jack Goldsmith and Amira Mikhail, Does the Iran Deal Require the USG to 
Seek Preemption of (Some) State Sanctions? (Lawfare, Apr 27, 2016), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/4SK7-ARL2. For a list of many other sanctions that the Iran deal left in place, 
see Rennack, Iran at *33–36 (cited in note 121). 
 125 See David E. Sanger, Trump Seeks Way to Declare Iran in Violation of Nuclear 
Deal (NY Times, July 27, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/world/ 
middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-agreement.html (visited Aug 19, 2017) (Perma archive 
unavailable) (describing how President Trump is interested in abandoning the Iran deal 
despite having continued to abide by it so far). 
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likely face even more notable constraints. These statutes may 
have broad substantive scope, but the discretion they provide is 
likely to be bestowed on an agency rather than on the president 
and to include procedural safeguards like judicial review. Con-
sider, for example, a statute that gives broad discretion to an ad-
ministrative agency to regulate on health, food safety, or the en-
vironment. As a practical matter, if the president wishes to 
implement an international commitment by using the discretion 
accorded to the agency, then he or she must negotiate it within 
these limits, must obtain buy-in from the agency, and must also 
run the risk that this buy-in will be withdrawn—and the commit-
ment’s implementation put at risk—during a future administra-
tion.126 In addition, the agency’s actions in implementing the stat-
ute will almost certainly be subject to judicial review (under the 
APA or the statute’s own terms) with respect to whether these 
actions are consistent with the statute and neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. As Professor Jack Goldsmith put it, in considering 
Obama’s energetic use of these kinds of international commit-
ments, their underlying “domestic authority . . . , unlike many as-
sertions of presidential foreign relations power, can be reviewed 
by domestic federal courts,” making for “significantly more ac-
countability than the vast majority of presidential actions in for-
eign relations.”127 
C. International Commitments in Perspective 
The restructured separation of powers described above occurs 
in the context of international commitments. At a higher level of 
generality, however, it is consistent with a broader account of 
how, across many areas of governance, the various strands of ap-
plicable law are not hermetically sealed from each other. Instead, 
they interact in ongoing ways that affect not only the functional 
separation of powers but also the development of legal doctrine. 
Scholars of constitutional law and administrative law have 
explored their relationship in domestic contexts. As one notable 
example, Professor Gillian Metzger argues that “ordinary ad-
ministrative law” serves as “a species of constitutional common 
law,” bringing constitutional values into the practice of govern-
ance.128 Agencies are sensitive to constitutional concerns in their 
 
 126 See Part IV.B (discussing this possibility with respect to the Paris Agreement). 
 127 Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 471 (cited in note 37). 
 128 Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 
110 Colum L Rev 479, 485 (2010). 
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decision-making, and courts applying administrative law in re-
viewing agency decisions draw on constitutional separation-of-
powers principles.129 In turn, “ordinary administrative law and 
administrative practice [have shaped] the scope of constitutional 
requirements [in a way that] is of a piece with the numerous 
ways in which constitutional law has bent and transformed in 
response to the institutional and regulatory needs of the modern 
administrative state.”130 Administrative law comes to substitute 
in part for constitutional law, but it does so largely because it 
also provides for checks and balances. 
Just as functional and institutional needs led constitutional 
law to accept the administrative state, so have similar needs led 
to the rise of alternatives to the Treaty Clause. These alternatives 
in turn rely heavily on administrative law for implementation 
and thus on all the underlying constitutional principles that this 
law incorporates. This includes any use of federalism. The more 
the president seeks to make international commitments whose 
implementation will require the cooperation of US states, the 
more influence these states will have on international negotia-
tions despite the president’s formal constitutional control over 
such negotiations. 
The insights in this Article also relate to a body of scholarship 
that considers the interplay between international law and con-
stitutional law. While in theory international law and constitu-
tional law could serve as structural substitutes,131 in practice their 
relationship is more complicated. Judicial review is not always 
available for foreign affairs matters,132 and, especially in the 
 
 129 See id at 486–512. For an extended historical account of how agencies can engage 
in constitutional decision-making, see generally Sophia Z. Lee, The Workplace Constitu-
tion from the New Deal to the New Right (Cambridge 2014). 
 130 Metzger, 110 Colum L Rev at 508 (cited in note 128). See also Michaels, 115 Colum 
L Rev at 520 (cited in note 60). The role played by federalism in administrative law can 
similarly have structural implications for constitutional principles of the separation of pow-
ers, as the work of Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen shows. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federal-
ism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 Colum L Rev 459, 461–63 (2012). 
 131 See Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 Stan 
J Intl L 1, 36–49 (2013) (arguing that the president’s foreign affairs powers as a matter of 
domestic law should vary with the level of constraint arising from the international polit-
ical context). 
 132 By contrast, administrative law’s ability to channel constitutional values and to 
substitute for other forms of constitutional checks is due in no small part to the availability 
of judicial review. See Metzger, 110 Colum L Rev at 485 (cited in note 128) (noting the 
significance of “judicial development of administrative law doctrines that respond to con-
stitutional concerns associated with administrative government”). 
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security context, the executive branch sometimes plays interna-
tional law and constitutional law off each other in ways that erode 
them both.133 This literature urges caution before assuming that 
international law can serve successfully as a long-term structural 
substitute for constitutional law. 
Unlike in the security context, however, the president faces 
important process checks with regard to international commit-
ments at the international level that increase its reliability as a 
constraint. The executive branch can undertake uses of force 
based on broad interpretations of international law on self-
defense without getting other nations to agree with this position, 
but it cannot negotiate a multilateral commitment without get-
ting other nations on board.134 The agreement of these nations 
would be needed not only to make a commitment, but also to make 
changes in the international legal superstructure of existing ma-
jor international agreements that exist in most areas of interna-
tional cooperation. The constraints that apply to the making of 
international agreements are thus more self-enforcing than the 
constraints that tend to exist with regard to the interpretation of 
substantive international law. 
III.  INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE FUTURE 
Scholars and the political branches have long accepted the 
practical necessity of putting the executive branch in control of 
minor commitments, which are the bread and butter of US inter-
national engagement. But what about major commitments? The 
Obama administration deliberately avoided seeking the explicit 
approval of the Senate or Congress for some important commit-
ments, thus extending past practices with regard to alternative 
pathways and achieving core policy interests. This Part defends 
these developments from a normative perspective, taking into ac-
count the importance of international cooperation, the existence 
of the checks and balances described earlier in this Article that 
are distinct from those embodied in congressional approval, and 
 
 133 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interac-
tive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 
NYU L Rev 689, 708–12 (2016); Rebecca Ingber, International Law Constraints as Execu-
tive Power, 57 Harv Intl L J 49, 57–90 (2016); Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1008–33 (cited in 
note 82). 
 134 See Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U Chi L Rev 65, 68 (2016) 
(noting that if “one recognizes that US national security increasingly relies on relation-
ships with foreign partners, then the idea that the executive responds to foreign critiques 
and concerns to enable ongoing partnerships has bite”). 
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the further check that arises from the existing uncertainties sur-
rounding where the constitutional boundaries lie. In light of this 
normative defense, this Part then intervenes in several ongoing 
structural and doctrinal debates in foreign relations law. 
A. In Praise of Multiple Pathways 
What are we to make of the current system and in particular 
of the executive branch’s ability to make major international com-
mitments without getting specific legislative approval? The clear-
est line drawn by this system with respect to the separation of 
powers between the executive branch and the legislature is one 
whereby the executive branch can enter into international com-
mitments on its own but needs some kind of preexisting or subse-
quent action from the Senate or Congress in order for the terms 
of these commitments to be implemented through domestic law. 
This line may not be perfect, but it is better than one that requires 
the executive branch to get specific legislative approval for all ma-
jor commitments, or for the narrower subset of all major agree-
ments, or even for the still narrower subset of all major agree-
ments whose implementation requires the use of domestic law. 
This line promotes international cooperation; it satisfies core 
structural principles related not only to checks and balances but 
also more specifically to democratic accountability; and it relies 
constructively on the very uncertainty surrounding it. Together, 
these virtues provide the current system with a solid normative 
grounding. 
1. Promoting international cooperation. 
The current system favors international engagement by giv-
ing the executive branch more ways to make international com-
mitments. Without the rise of ex post congressional-executive 
agreements as an alternative to the Treaty Clause, we might not 
have had the annexation of Texas, the creation of the Saint 
Lawrence Seaway, or free trade agreements like NAFTA.135 If the 
president could not make any major international commitments 
on his own, we might not have had the Paris Peace Accords end-
ing the Vietnam War, the Shanghai Communique leading to the 
normalization of relations with mainland China, or the Helsinki 
Accords bettering relations between the Soviet Union and the 
 
 135 See Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 802–06, 832–36, 893–95 (cited in 
note 16). 
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West.136 If the executive branch needed specific legislative ap-
proval in order to make international commitments whose imple-
mentation depends on US domestic law, then we might not have 
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and 
its various protocols,137 Basel III,138 the Iran deal, or the Paris 
Agreement. 
One may disagree with the merits of one or more of these 
commitments, but it is hard to argue with their collective demon-
stration that the Treaty Clause presents too high a bar to action 
to be the only route available for major international commit-
ments. The message of the second and third sets of examples is 
that sometimes specific congressional approval similarly presents 
too high a bar. In the domestic context, some form of congressional 
action is usually a starting point for executive branch action. This 
creates enormous challenges for governance, particularly with 
the rise of partisan polarization and its attendant congressional 
gridlock in recent years.139 In the international context, always 
requiring specific congressional action would be even less palata-
ble. International cooperation is often highly desirable, and some-
times, especially in the context of peace and security, it is essen-
tial. Because the United States has less control over international 
affairs than domestic ones, the executive branch can have an even 
higher functional need to act in this context—and to do so with 
flexibility and sometimes with speed. Indeed, if specific congres-
sional approval were required for all major international commit-
ments, then these commitments would face greater process hur-
dles than exist for domestic legislation, as they would require not 
only the agreement of Congress and the president but also of the 
international negotiating partners. 
The appropriateness of allowing the executive branch to 
make major international commitments without specific legisla-
tive approval is made all the more clear when considered in 
tandem with the president’s war powers. The president today can 
 
 136 See Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 287–88 (cited in note 90); Hollis and Newcomer, 
49 Va J Intl L at 510–11 (cited in note 44). 
 137 Wirth, 39 Harv Envir L Rev at 552 (cited in note 37). 
 138 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 786 (cited in note 7). 
 139 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va L Rev 
953, 959–63 (2016) (describing the general rise of partisan polarization). See also generally 
Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, President Obama, Congress and International Agree-
ments: An Initial Assessment (APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Aug 28, 2011), archived 
at http://perma.cc/S45R-5523 (concluding that Senate polarization with respect to treaties 
had been even higher for President Obama than for prior presidents). 
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initiate the use of force with relatively few checks, either interna-
tionally or domestically.140 If specific legislative approval were re-
quired for international commitments, then this would effectively 
incentivize the president toward force over diplomacy. By allow-
ing the president to unilaterally end the Vietnam War, normalize 
relationships with China, and ease relations with the Soviet 
Union, the current system gives greater space for diplomacy. This 
point holds as well for the Iran deal. If President Obama had 
needed specific congressional approval for the deal, then he would 
have had greater incentives to pursue military alternatives to 
stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.141 The war–
diplomacy trade-off is less evident for climate-change agree-
ments—though still present in the long run142—and absent from 
some other forms of international commitments, but when it ex-
ists it is an important factor to consider. 
In defending the use of multiple pathways as a means to pro-
moting international cooperation, this discussion assumes nei-
ther that multiple pathways are always necessary to such cooper-
ation nor that such cooperation is always good. The arguments 
are instead qualified ones. The lower the barriers to international 
commitments that there are as a matter of legislative process, the 
less functional need there is for alternative pathways. If our sys-
tem of governance were parliamentary or were structured in ways 
that made it much less prone to polarization, then the functional 
need for alternative pathways would be lessened. Without such 
changes (and at present they seem highly unlikely), the exist-
ence of multiple pathways serves as a workable and valuable 
substitute. Similarly, the claim that international cooperation is 
desirable should not be mistaken for the claim that it is always 
desirable (let alone that it will please everyone). International co-
operation is itself only a means to the ends of peace, prosperity, 
 
 140 See generally Bradley and Galbraith, 91 NYU L Rev 689 (cited in note 133) (de-
scribing the growth of the president’s unilateral war powers over time, including the power 
to act without congressional authorization). 
 141 Even with diplomatic options, forcible intervention remains a possibility, as 
demonstrated by the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, which 
was carried out in part by the United States. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up 
Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran (NY Times, June 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
2F2T-LPYS. 
 142 See US Department of Defense, National Security Implications of Climate-Related 
Risks and a Changing Climate *3 (July 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/C6BG-Y7SQ 
(noting that “climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, 
contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic re-
sources such as food and water”). 
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the promotion of human rights, and the protection of shared com-
mons; it can also be used in ways that undermine these values. 
We should hope and expect that the executive branch will ordi-
narily seek to use international cooperation in favor of good ends 
rather than bad ones. The structural checks and balances that 
come with the alternative pathways increase the likelihood that 
this will prove true. 
2. Satisfying core structural principles. 
Turning to structure, the current system builds in important 
checks on presidential overreaching, including checks that are 
tied to legislative involvement. Part II showed how this system 
constrains presidential power through multiple strands of law. To 
borrow from a broader conversation on presidential power, the fi-
nal result is one of “power and constraint” rather than the “exec-
utive unbound.”143 Importantly, some of these constraints reflect 
forms of democratic accountability. These forms of oversight are 
less obvious, less demanding, and less supermajoritarian than the 
need to get the affirmative approval of either the Senate or 
Congress. They nonetheless are meaningful and make it highly 
likely that international commitments that bypass specific leg-
islative approval will do more than simply reflect presidential 
preferences. 
This issue of democratic accountability is particularly salient 
for important international commitments that will be imple-
mented through US domestic law. The Iran deal and the Paris 
Agreement are examples of such commitments made by Obama. 
US commitments under the Iran deal are being implemented by 
the president using authority delegated to him by preexisting con-
gressional laws that allow him to waive sanctions against Iran if 
he deems it in the national interest.144 At the Paris negotiations, 
US negotiators anticipated that US commitments under the Paris 
Agreement would be implemented through the EPA’s preexisting 
authority under the Clean Air Act.145 These commitments thus 
deal with matters that fall under the purview of Congress, as 
opposed to matters of recognition, security, and diplomacy with 
 
 143 Compare generally Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Pres-
idency after 9/11 (Norton 2012), with Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive 
Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford 2010). 
 144 See Rennack, Iran at *5–31 (cited in note 121) (outlining the fuller and more com-
plex picture). 
 145 See Part IV.B. 
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regard to which the president is understood to have considerable 
independent constitutional powers. Yet the Congresses that 
passed these preexisting laws did not expressly authorize them to 
be used as implementing authority for international commit-
ments. Given the absence of express authorization, should the ex-
ecutive branch be able to infer that it can harness these laws to 
its own international objectives? 
Two reasons suggest that the answer should generally be yes. 
First, in relying on these laws to implement international com-
mitments, the Obama administration was furthering the congres-
sional purposes underlying these laws. In the case of the Iran 
sanctions, Congress deliberately entrusted the president with 
broad discretion to lift them in order to advance US national in-
terests. Allowing the president to use his delegated powers as ne-
gotiating leverage with Iran seems like a patently obvious way to 
use this discretion.146 In the case of the Clean Air Act, the purpos-
ive link is at a higher level of generality. The Congress that 
passed the Clean Air Act in the 1970s did not have climate change 
clearly in mind, let alone international coordination in relation to 
it. But its broader purpose of protecting public health and welfare 
through the regulation of air pollution is advanced if the United 
States can persuade other countries to reduce their own air pol-
lution, because air pollution is a transborder problem (especially 
for climate change).147 To the extent that the Clean Air Act also 
sought to balance economic concerns, its use as negotiating lever-
age to get other countries to act with respect to climate change 
likewise promotes this interest—the more other countries are ad-
dressing climate change, the more the playing field is leveled in 
terms of effects on economic competition. There are doubtless 
some issues in which international cooperation would not en-
hance the underlying congressional purposes,148 but in general 
such cooperation seems likely to do so. 
 
 146 See Japan Whaling Association v American Cetacean Society, 478 US 221, 241 
(1986) (concluding that the secretary of commerce “furthered [the] objective” of a statute 
authorizing the impositions of sanctions related to whaling when he chose not to impose 
sanctions but instead to “enter[ ] into [an] agreement with Japan, calling for that nation’s 
acceptance of [a] worldwide moratorium on commercial whaling”). 
 147 See 42 USC § 7415 (noting the prospect of “[i]nternational air pollution”). 
 148 See Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 467–68 (cited in note 37) (discussing a congres-
sional statute that sought to limit certain forms of collaboration with China in the tech-
nology space). 
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A second reason why the executive branch should be able to 
harness preexisting laws to implement international commit-
ments that it makes without specific legislative approval is that 
this process naturally brings the interests of Congress into the 
negotiation and implementation of an international commitment. 
If it intends to rely on preexisting legislation for implementing 
authority, the executive branch can agree only to terms with re-
spect to implementation that are within the bounds of what the 
Congress that passed this legislation already authorized as a mat-
ter of domestic law. Similarly, in implementing the international 
commitment domestically, the executive branch must accept 
whatever tools of accountability are built into the law it is using 
for implementation authority, including judicial review. The ex-
ecutive branch also has some degree of accountability to the cur-
rent Congress, although far less than if it needed to get that Con-
gress to vote affirmatively in favor of the commitment. At a 
minimum, the executive branch must have enough supporters in 
Congress to prevent the passage of a veto-proof law that strips it 
of its ability to rely on the preexisting legislation, whether by 
modifying that legislation or providing that it cannot be the basis 
for implementation.149 The executive branch will also be subject to 
whatever soft-law tools the current Congress deploys.150 The more 
the preexisting law gives implementing authority to administra-
tive agencies rather than to the president, the greater Congress’s 
abilities will be to deploy these tools. 
A distinct but related ground for concern about the demo-
cratic accountability of international commitments made without 
specific legislative approval goes to whether they would unduly 
thwart changes in democratic preferences over time. If the presi-
dent makes an international commitment whose terms extend be-
yond his or her time in office, then the next president may feel 
pressured to honor this commitment despite not approving of it.151 
 
 149 For a discussion of the complicated way in which these issues played out in relation 
to the Iran deal, see David M. Herszenhorn, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Congress Has Its Say 
(NY Times, Sept 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U7QP-VV2T. 
 150 See Part I.B. 
 151 Similarly, Congress might feel pressured to honor an international commitment 
and therefore not repeal or alter preexisting legislation that is being used to implement 
this commitment. Professors Hathaway and Kapczynski make this argument in relation 
to ACTA, see Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37), even though it 
has a 180-day withdrawal provision that could be invoked. See ACTA Art 41, 50 ILM at 
256. I focus here only on the future president’s incentives because any efforts by Congress 
to get the United States to violate or withdraw from an international commitment would 
almost certainly need his or her support. 
 
2017] From Treaties to International Commitments 1719 
 
Professor Ramsey, for example, argues that nonbinding political 
commitment cannot “constrain future Presidents (even infor-
mally)” without raising constitutional problems,152 and Professor 
Goldsmith notes that “the President can effectively change reli-
ance interests through his delegated authorities in ways that are 
credible and sticky because they are hard for a future president 
to unwind.”153 For international agreements that do not expressly 
allow for withdrawal or that allow for withdrawal only after the 
passage of multiple years, the issue is particularly significant be-
cause the future president would have to choose between abiding 
by the agreement for an extended period of time or failing to com-
ply with an international legal obligation.154 
This concern is legitimate but adequately met by the current 
system. To begin with, the administration that makes an interna-
tional commitment should foresee the risk that a new administra-
tion will have different preferences. While it has incentives to try 
to nudge this administration toward continuing its approach, it 
also must recognize that the more partisan a commitment it 
makes, the greater the odds are that this commitment will be re-
pudiated. It must also recognize that failing to leave the next ad-
ministration with an internationally lawful option of exit could 
incentivize that administration to pursue violations of interna-
tional law in ways that could damage the reputation of the United 
States. This is one reason that using nonbinding international 
commitments will be appealing to an administration, as it pro-
vides a lawful if diplomatically awkward justification for noncom-
pliance and means of exit. 
For international agreements, the legal availability of with-
drawal is more complicated. Most international agreements con-
tain withdrawal clauses that the future president could choose to 
invoke.155 As a matter of administrative procedure, the C-175 
Procedure makes the proposed duration of an agreement a factor 
that is to be considered in determining whether or not to seek 
 
 152 Ramsey, 11 FIU L Rev at 375–76 (cited in note 44). 
 153 Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 471 (cited in note 37). See also Koh, 126 Yale L J F 
at 359–61 (cited in note 39) (discussing how the “default path of least resistance becomes 
compliance”). 
 154 See Hathaway, 119 Yale L J at 258–59 (cited in note 55) (arguing that as a pru-
dential matter, international agreements whose terms require more than a year’s notice 
for withdrawal should go to the Senate or Congress for specific approval). 
 155 See Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agree-
ment Design 143 (Cambridge 2016). 
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specific approval from the Senate or Congress.156 The rare inter-
national agreements that lack withdrawal procedures—such as 
major human-rights instruments—go to the Senate for approval 
as treaties as a matter of constitutional custom and perhaps con-
stitutional obligation, thus ensuring strong supramajoritarian re-
view.157 While many international agreements provide for with-
drawal upon a year or less of notice, some make withdrawal 
permissible beginning only after several years have elapsed since 
the agreement’s entry into force. The Minamata Convention, for 
example, provides that a nation can give one year’s notice of with-
drawal at any point after the initial three years following its entry 
into force.158 The Paris Agreement has a similar provision, except 
that it also provides a backdoor route for withdrawal after only a 
single year.159 Such agreements thus left a lawful exit route for 
the next president, but one that could not be invoked for a while. 
Because the administration that makes an international com-
mitment has reasons not to lock its successor in too thoroughly, the 
future president will typically have a lawful exit option available 
at some point during his or her term. In addition, regardless of 
international legal considerations, the next president’s own dem-
ocratically elected mandate may empower him or her to pursue 
exit or effective noncompliance. As a candidate, President Trump 
promised with respect to the Iran deal that he would “be so tough 
on [Iran] and ultimately that deal will be broken unless they be-
have better than they’ve ever behaved in their lives, which is 
probably unlikely.”160 Similarly, on climate, Trump promised dur-
ing his campaign that “[w]e’re going to cancel the Paris Climate 
Agreement and stop all payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N. 
global warming programs,” as well as to “rescind all the job-
destroying Obama executive actions, including the Climate 
Action Plan.”161 It remains to be seen just how much Trump will 
now follow through on these assertions, but he is currently pur-
suing them with vigor. There is no legal impediment to exiting 
 
 156 11 FAM § 723.3(7) (cited in note 69). 
 157 See Spiro, 79 Tex L Rev at 966, 1000–02 (cited in note 16). 
 158 Minamata Convention on Mercury Art 33, 55 ILM at 607. 
 159 See note 244 and accompanying text. 
 160 Transcript of Republican Presidential Candidates’ Debate in Miami (CNN, Mar 
15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Z6VS-UKQG. 
 161 An America First Energy Plan (Donald J. Trump for President, May 26, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/2MMZ-4K45 (transcript of speech delivered by Trump in 
Bismarck, North Dakota). 
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the Iran deal, and Trump is reported to be interested in exit.162 
While Trump cannot “cancel” the Paris Agreement immediately 
as a matter of international law, he has already started rolling 
back the Clean Action Plan and has announced his intention to 
withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement (and not 
to comply with it in the meantime).163 These examples illustrate 
how future presidents can roll back the international commit-
ments of their predecessors. 
3. Using uncertainty constructively. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty built into the current sys-
tem with respect to constitutional law. The line that the executive 
branch always needs some kind of preexisting or subsequent ac-
tion from the Senate or Congress in order for the terms of inter-
national commitments to be implemented through domestic law 
is only a rough one—in the claims-settlement context, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has held that a sole executive agreement 
does in fact constitute domestic law.164 Similarly, while the presi-
dent has very broad constitutional authority to make nonbinding 
commitments, the extent to which he or she can make interna-
tional agreements without the specific approval of the Senate or 
Congress remains deeply contested.165 
This uncertainty gives the executive branch considerable 
flexibility and probably promotes the long-term expansion of the 
president’s constitutional authority through historical practice. 
Yet at the same time it has a self-policing effect for whatever in-
ternational commitment is presently at issue because it raises the 
likelihood of resistance outside the executive branch (and possibly 
within it, too). The more the executive branch seeks to make a 
controversial international commitment without the specific ap-
proval of the legislature, the more it should anticipate pushback 
not just with respect to the merits of the commitment but also 
with respect to the process by which it was made. This in turn 
should encourage the executive branch to be cautious. Perhaps 
 
 162 See Sanger, Trump Seeks Way (cited in note 125). 
 163 See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (cited in note 22) 
(announcing that “as of today, the United States will cease all implementation” and that 
it “is time to exit the Paris Accord”); Executive Order 13783 § 4, 82 Fed Reg 16093, 16095 
(2017) (instructing the EPA administrator to seek to “suspend, revise, or rescind” the 
Clean Power Plan). 
 164 See United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937). 
 165 See Part I.A. 
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the Iran deal could constitutionally have been made as an agree-
ment that was binding under international law.166 Perhaps the 
Paris Agreement could have included binding emissions reduc-
tion targets, notwithstanding the positions taken by the executive 
branch and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee years earlier 
during the approval of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).167 In opting for the less dramatic position, the 
executive branch headed off stronger grounds for constitutional 
contestation from within the executive branch, from Congress, 
from the public, and potentially from the courts. As long as the 
courts do not give their stamp of approval to international com-
mitments that bypass the Senate or Congress, this self-policing 
instinct should remain. This in turn leaves the executive branch 
likely to continue to go to the Senate or Congress not just for in-
ternational commitments that require changes in domestic law 
for their implementation or for ones for which legislative buy-in 
is especially important on the merits, but also for international 
agreements that have exceptionally long time horizons or for 
which there is a particularly strong tradition of obtaining specific 
approval. 
Of course, the executive branch will sometimes choose to pro-
voke constitutional controversy, either out of a deliberate desire 
to set a precedent or because its international objectives lead it to 
take constitutionally controversial positions. When this happens, 
however, the executive branch may be most vulnerable to re-
sistance when it is also least constrained at the international le-
gal level or the administrative-law level. ACTA provides a good 
example. Opponents to this intellectual property agreement ar-
gued that the executive branch could not constitutionally join the 
United States to it, even assuming all the requirements for its 
domestic implementation were already provided for under 
preexisting US law.168 Interwoven with these arguments, how-
ever, were complaints about the secrecy of the process by which 
 
 166 See David Golove, Congress Just Gave the President Power to Adopt a Binding 
Legal Agreement with Iran (Just Security, May 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
7SH7-VZBB (arguing that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 unintention-
ally authorized the president as a matter of constitutional law to make a binding interna-
tional legal agreement with Iran). 
 167 See notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
 168 See, for example, Letter of Law Professors to the Senate Committee on Finance 
(May 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/RMY8-NAG2; Hathaway and Kapczynski, Go-
ing It Alone (cited in note 37); Jack Goldsmith and Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting 
Agreement Raises Constitutional Concerns (Wash Post, Mar 26, 2010), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/HBM2-F58R. 
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ACTA was negotiated internationally,169 about its failure to go 
through the C-175 Procedure in the usual way, and about the fail-
ure of the executive branch to provide a consistent and detailed 
defense of its intent to bypass the Senate and Congress.170 Public 
outcry against the secrecy of ACTA negotiations also occurred in 
Europe, and the European Parliament declined to ratify it.171 
Whether because of this decision in Europe or because of domestic 
pressure, the Obama administration did not ratify ACTA, despite 
having asserted its power to do so. 
As this example suggests, the very existence of legal uncer-
tainty itself acts as a further check to the current system. This 
uncertainty both can act as a direct check on executive branch 
overreaching and can empower the opponents of international 
commitments in ways that further robust political debate and the 
use of soft tools of democratic accountability. The more vulnerable 
an international commitment is from the perspective of interna-
tional legal checks and administrative-law checks, the more op-
ponents of the international commitment may be able to draw 
persuasively on constitutional concerns in the public arena and 
perhaps also in the courts. 
B. Structural and Doctrinal Implications 
Understanding the current system to be the product of three 
strands of law has implications for ongoing structural and 
doctrinal debates within the field of foreign relations law. This 
 
 169 See, for example, Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37): 
[N]egotiating partners complained to the United States about the unusual de-
gree of secrecy, arguing that the level of confidentiality in these ACTA negotia-
tions has been set at a higher level than is customary for non-security agree-
ments and that the secrecy had inhibited consultation with those who would be 
affected by the agreement. 
See also, for example, Goldsmith and Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (cited in note 
168) (“These mostly secret negotiations have already violated the Obama administration’s 
pledge for greater transparency. . . . Congress should resist this attempt to evade the 
checks established by our Framers.”). 
 170 Gwen Hinze, U.S. Law Professors Cast Further Doubt on ACTA’s Constitutional-
ity—State Department Confirms No ACTA Pre-review (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
May 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/YX5S-45MA (noting that a FOIA request pro-
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the executive branch’s approach of first defending ACTA as a sole executive agreement 
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1724  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:1675 
   
Article has already shown descriptively how this system incorpo-
rates checks from all three strands and has offered a qualified 
normative defense of this system. These descriptive and norma-
tive claims in turn have implications for three related debates: 
first, whether international agreements that do not receive spe-
cific legislative approval need to be subject to more accountability 
mechanisms; second, whether the Senate and Congress need to 
put in place easier processes for providing legislative approval; 
and third, how strong the president’s constitutional powers with 
respect to negotiation and domestic implementation should be 
understood to be. 
1. Balancing accountability and flexibility. 
As this Article has shown, international law and administra-
tive law provide accountability mechanisms for international 
commitments that executive branch actors make without getting 
specific legislative approval. For major international commit-
ments, international negotiations and subsequent compliance 
procedures often provide for considerable transparency and op-
portunities for broader participation. On the domestic front, the 
Case-Zablocki Act, the C-175 Procedure, any laws specific to agen-
cies involved in international negotiations, and now Executive 
Order 13609 all further accountability, as do the limits that come 
with the implementation process and the tools of soft power that 
members of Congress can invoke. 
Professor Hathaway has argued that existing measures are 
not enough and that there needs to be stronger oversight of all 
international agreements that do not receive the specific approval 
of the Senate or Congress.172 She suggests multiple reforms for all 
such agreements, including that they be provided to Congress 
before they enter into force, that the State Department be public 
and specific about the constitutional justification for the path-
way that it uses for each agreement, and that Congress pass an 
APA-like statute providing for public opportunity for notice and 
comment during the negotiation of international agreements.173 
Hathaway’s proposals amount to effortful remedies to a 
mostly nonexistent problem. In her view, the entire system needs 
reform not because it is producing bad agreements, but because 
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the president has too much power and too little oversight. This 
position in turn rests on her perspective that the president acts 
“alone” and “almost entirely unfettered.”174 Hathaway focuses on 
the checks that exist from a constitutional perspective and thus 
does not take into account the existing constraints that come with 
the international legal process or with the involvement of agen-
cies, who are in turn accountable not only to the president but 
also to Congress, the courts, and their own constituencies. The 
steps she recommends would come at a real cost, in both money 
and time, to the executive branch for the hundreds of interna-
tional agreements (mostly minor ones) that it makes every year. 
This in turn would probably have the effect of incentivizing exec-
utive branch actors more toward nonbinding commitments, which 
are not subject to Hathaway’s proposals. Of course, this could be 
addressed by trying to tighten oversight with regard to nonbind-
ing commitments—but that would require more time, cost, and has-
sle, and thus have a deterrent effect on international cooperation. 
Retail fixes offer a better way of dealing with accountability 
concerns than do wholesale ones. The type and strengths of con-
straints vary across specific contexts at both the international 
and domestic levels. Negotiations of new international agree-
ments that are occurring under UN auspices will have greater 
transparency and opportunities for participation than will re-
gional trade agreements. International commitments that are to 
be implemented by authority previously delegated to the presi-
dent will have fewer administrative-law safeguards than ones to 
be implemented by authority delegated to agencies. Some admin-
istrative agencies involved in international cooperation operate 
with less congressional scrutiny than do others.175 Context will de-
termine how good the balance is in any particular situation, and 
calls for reform should therefore be contextually grounded. 
One retail fix that the executive branch could undertake on 
its own or with the encouragement of Congress would be to make 
public its legal reasoning on the constitutionality of especially sig-
nificant international agreements for which it does not obtain 
specific legislative approval. The Obama administration was pub-
lic with regard to its legal analysis on many sensitive national 
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security issues. Through speeches, testimony, and the release of 
legal memoranda, it explained its legal positions with respect to 
issues as sensitive as the use of force in Libya176 and the targeted 
killing abroad of American citizens.177 Yet when asked for the le-
gal reasoning behind its claim that the United States could join 
ACTA without the specific approval of the Senate or Congress, the 
administration gave brief and somewhat conflicting responses.178 
By making its legal reasoning clearer for major international 
agreements, the administration would be providing another 
venue for administrative-law principles of transparency and ac-
countability, even as over time such transparency would probably 
strengthen its constitutional arguments as a matter of historical 
practice. 
2. Making legislative approval easier. 
The current system will be with us for the foreseeable future. 
This is true not only with respect to the many international com-
mitments that do not receive specific approval from the Senate or 
Congress, but also for the pathways that do require such specific 
approval, including treaties and ex post congressional-executive 
agreements. The executive branch will continue to make treaties 
and ex post congressional-executive agreements when changes to 
domestic law are needed for implementation, when there is a par-
ticular desire for domestic support, when there is a need to signal 
to other nations the seriousness of the US commitment, and 
when, for certain types of agreements, long-standing practice per-
haps amounting to constitutional law effectively requires legisla-
tive approval. 
Right now, obtaining legislative approval for international 
agreements is a deeply unpredictable process. This is true not 
only with respect to whether the votes will be there to support a 
particular agreement, but also with respect to whether and when 
the agreement can get through all the procedural veto gates in 
order to receive a floor vote. Right now, most major international 
 
 176 Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Attorney General, Authority to Use Military 
Force in Libya 12 (Apr 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/C2W7-ZJXN; Libya and War 
Powers, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 
11 (2011) (statement of Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department of State). 
 177 See generally Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Opera-
tion Directed against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an 
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agreements that require specific legislative approval go to the 
Senate as treaties and can further require the passage of imple-
menting legislation from Congress.179 It can take years or decades 
for these treaties to receive floor votes or for the passage of their 
implementing legislation.180 The only major category of interna-
tional agreements that has gone to Congress for approval as ex 
post congressional-executive agreements in recent years is trade 
agreements.181 In practice, the ability of these agreements to re-
ceive a floor vote depends on whether or not there is preexisting 
“fast-track” legislation that guarantees a speedy vote for these 
agreements.182 Such legislation has existed on and off over the 
years; the present version applies for the next handful of years.183 
In recent years, scholars have made numerous proposals for 
making the treaty process and the ex post congressional-executive 
agreement process more efficient. For treaties, the Senate’s 
advice-and-consent process could provide conditional prenegotia-
tion approval184 or set up a fast-track process.185 The Senate could 
also take steps to reduce or eliminate the need for implementing 
legislation,186 or alternatively Congress could streamline the pro-
cess for passing it.187 For ex post congressional-executive agree-
ments, Congress could provide a long-term fast-track option for 
all agreements.188 
The alternatives to treaties described in this Article offer rea-
sons why the Senate and Congress should be willing to consider 
these moves. The harder it is for the executive branch to get spe-
cific approval from the Senate and Congress—and the more 
uncertainty there is about this process—the more incentives the 
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executive branch has to try to structure an international commit-
ment in ways that allow it to bypass specific approval entirely. As 
Goldsmith wrote toward the end of the Obama administration, 
“Senate, Congress, wake up and pay attention!”189 If the Senate or 
Congress wants more of a role, then they need to bring either car-
rots or sticks to bear—and, because of the president’s veto power, 
carrots are more likely to succeed as legislation than sticks. 
Easier legislative approval would have advantages not only 
for the institutional power of the Senate and Congress, but also 
for US interests more generally. It would offer the executive 
branch more flexibility in international negotiations, as it would 
have more reason to think itself able to obtain congressional ap-
proval and thus more reason to pursue terms that would require 
changes to US domestic law. It would also make it easier to nego-
tiate agreements aimed at changing the superstructure of inter-
national law. The major international agreements that define the 
international legal system may need updating over time, and leg-
islative approval would be important to such endeavors. 
3. Retaining checks in negotiation and implementation. 
This Article has defended the diminishment of specific legis-
lative approval for international commitments largely on the 
grounds that alternative constraints exist with respect to the ne-
gotiation and implementation of these commitments. One further 
set of implications from this Article, therefore, is that especially 
strong constitutional claims of presidential power in these do-
mains should be resisted. 
With regard to negotiations, the executive branch has long fa-
vored the sweeping language from United States v Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp190 that “the President alone has the power to speak 
or listen as a representative of the nation . . . he alone negoti-
ates.”191 In a soft form, this is undeniably correct: the president 
and his or her agents act internationally for the United States. 
But this language should not be taken to mean that members of 
Congress, independent regulatory agencies, and US states cannot 
constitutionally share their own positions with respect to interna-
tional negotiations and even directly with negotiators from other 
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countries. The letter authored by Senator Cotton and many other 
Republican senators to the “Leaders of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran”192 may have been unprecedented and an exercise of poor 
judgment, but, contra to the view of then–Secretary of State John 
Kerry, it should not be considered “unconstitutional.”193 Instead, 
it should be viewed as an example of how the institutional powers 
exercised by members of Congress may change over time as coun-
terweights to developments in the president’s power to choose. 
The Supreme Court has recently signaled an interest in rolling 
back the strong language from Curtiss-Wright.194 Such an ap-
proach would promote the structural checks and balances dis-
cussed in this Article. 
Turning to implementation, as discussed earlier, the presi-
dent typically needs the Senate or Congress in order to implement 
international commitments that require the alteration of domes-
tic law. But this line is a rough one. In the claims-settlement con-
text, for example, the Supreme Court has held that sole executive 
agreements—and even presidential policy—can preempt state 
law.195 In addition, the Supreme Court has recently held that the 
president has the exclusive power of recognizing foreign na-
tions,196 and it therefore seems logical that decisions and inter-
national commitments made by the president with regard to 
recognition should have effect as domestic law.197 Outside of these 
contexts, though, the analysis in this Article suggests that courts 
should energetically resist attempts to treat international com-
mitments that do not have the clear approval of Congress as do-
mestic law or as preempting state law. In addition, given the use-
ful structural role that state and local governments can play as a 
counterweight to presidential power, courts should be wary of 
 
 192 Cotton, et al, Open Letter (cited in note 98). For purposes of this discussion, I as-
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strong attempts to box these actors out of engagement with for-
eign affairs.198 
With respect to international and administrative law, how-
ever, courts need not be as concerned about giving some leeway 
to the executive branch in implementation. Courts typically defer 
to the executive branch with respect to the interpretation both of 
international law and administrative statutes. In practice, how-
ever, courts have considerable flexibility in terms of how much 
deference they actually give, and this flexibility gives them an-
other tool of control over executive branch overreaching.199 With 
the move toward international commitments that do not receive 
specific legislative approval but will be implemented through 
preexisting administrative law, one interesting question is 
whether courts should pay any attention to the international com-
mitment in reviewing agency actions taken under the authority 
of the preexisting statute. While courts should be wary of apply-
ing a strong version of the Charming Betsy canon200 in these con-
texts, a touch of added deference seems appropriate.201 
 
 198 For scholarship urging resistance to expansive executive power with respect to 
implementation and preemption, see, for example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the 
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IV.  THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS A CASE STUDY 
In his last year in office, President Obama joined the United 
States to the Paris Agreement on climate without the explicit ap-
proval of either the Senate or Congress.202 This decision show-
cases the dynamics described in this Article. On the one hand, it 
demonstrates how constitutional constraints on the approval of 
international agreements have eroded in modern times. Indeed, 
it was called “outrageous,” “unlawful,” and “a clear example of the 
executive overreach in the area of foreign affairs.”203 On the other 
hand, when the negotiation and implementation of the Paris 
Agreement are taken into account, it is apparent that Obama 
acted under powerful constraints arising from the conjunction of 
international law, constitutional law, and administrative law. As 
subsequent events are already revealing, his actions remain 
deeply vulnerable to resistance and reversal. 
Overall, the Paris Agreement demonstrates just how im-
portant the availability of multiple pathways to making interna-
tional commitments has become to the functioning of foreign re-
lations law. For those convinced of the urgent need for action with 
respect to climate change, it also illustrates the value of this di-
versity of pathways. This Part first briefly sets the Paris 
Agreement in the broader context of US participation in climate 
negotiations. It then describes the web of checks on Obama’s uses 
of power that have arisen or will arise with respect to its negotia-
tion, approval, and implementation. 
A. From Rio to Paris 
In 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the UNFCCC at 
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.204 Finalized earlier that year, 
the UNFCCC had both substantive and procedural elements. 
Substantively, it committed state parties to taking steps to com-
bat climate change but left vague many aspects relating to the 
content of these steps.205 Procedurally, it set up an institutional 
and legal framework for the conduct of future negotiations about 
 
 202 See Eilperin, Obama Hails ‘Historic’ Ratification (cited in note 9). 
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climate change, including through the establishment of a 
Conference of Parties that would hold annual meetings.206 
Bush then submitted the UNFCCC to the Senate for advice 
and consent.207 This was the easy and obvious choice. As a matter 
of politics, obtaining the Senate’s approval was straightforward. 
Both Democrats and Republicans wanted it done before the 1992 
elections, and the treaty received the Senate’s advice and consent 
with astonishing speed—within a mere month of its submis-
sion.208 As a matter of law, treating the UNFCCC as a treaty put 
it on unquestionable constitutional footing and was consistent 
with how the recent Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer and related protocols had been treated.209 
During the advice-and-consent process, actors in both the ex-
ecutive branch and the Senate considered what domestic pathway 
would be appropriate for future protocols to the UNFCCC. The 
administration stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that “we would expect” a future “protocol containing targets and 
timetables [to] be submitted to the Senate” for advice and con-
sent.210 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in its 
committee report that a “decision . . . to adopt targets and time-
tables would have to be submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
consent.”211 
Between 1992 and 2009, however, two important develop-
ments dramatically changed the incentives for a president con-
cerned about climate change to return to the Senate with a sub-
stantive treaty. First, what had been merely predictable became 
painstakingly obvious: getting domestic approval for a treaty that 
provided for strong substantive action on climate change would 
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be about as easy as getting a camel through the eye of the prover-
bial needle. Two-thirds of the Senate would never back such a 
treaty under a Democratic president, and no Republican presi-
dent would put such a treaty forward. During the Clinton admin-
istration, this was manifested by the failure of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, which had no chance in the Senate.212 In the George W. 
Bush era, this was made clear by the administration’s under-
whelming interest in addressing climate change.213 
The second important change was the Supreme Court’s 5–4 
decision in Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency.214 
The Court held that, contrary to the views taken by the Bush II 
administration, the Clean Air Act permitted and indeed effec-
tively obligated the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.215 
Although this decision was purely about the interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act, it had major implications for international commit-
ments. Most importantly, it meant that the EPA could now im-
plement an international commitment that required domestic ac-
tion, as long as this domestic action followed proper procedures 
and lay within the substantive scope of its now-clarified authority 
under the Clean Air Act. 
Obama thus came into office with a pathway for implement-
ing a negotiated climate commitment domestically in a way that 
would not require congressional legislation. Consistent with the 
long time horizons associated with the negotiation of major inter-
national agreements, only when the Paris Agreement was 
reached in December 2015 was this pathway fully realized.216 
B. Paris and Presidential Power 
The Paris Agreement reveals both the opportunities and lim-
its of the president’s power to choose. Obama described it as “his-
toric,” as “ambitious,” as “establish[ing] the enduring framework 
the world needs to solve the climate crisis,” and overall as some-
thing that “can be a turning point for the world.”217 So much was 
acknowledged to be at stake—yet Obama chose not to go to the 
 
 212 See Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 303–04 (cited in note 90). 
 213 See John R. Crook, ed, Note, U.S. Positions in International Climate Change Ne-
gotiations, 102 Am J Intl L 155, 166 (2008). 
 214 549 US 497 (2007). 
 215 Id at 528–35. 
 216 An earlier nonbinding commitment done in 2009 at the UNFCCC Conference of 
the Parties at Copenhagen was in part a precursor to the Paris Agreement. See 
Copenhagen Accord (Dec 18, 2009), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 4–7. 
 217 Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement (cited in note 19). 
 
1734  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:1675 
   
Senate or to Congress for approval. More than that, he bypassed 
the Senate and Congress precisely because the issue was so im-
portant and the odds of legislative approval were so low. Focusing 
just on the approval process, this seems like a quintessential ex-
ample of unchecked presidential power. But a close look at the 
international, constitutional, and administrative legal issues un-
derlying the negotiation, approval, and implementation of the 
Paris Agreement reveals a very different story. In actuality, the 
Obama administration was so hemmed in on every front that the 
Paris Agreement amounted to an improbable and brilliant suc-
cess. The acts of the Trump administration to date suggest that 
this success may prove to be a fleeting one. 
1. Negotiation. 
In negotiating the Paris Agreement, the Obama administra-
tion had to contend not only with the constraints accompanying 
the negotiating process but also with those that it foresaw arising 
with respect to approval and implementation. This is true for all 
international commitments (as Part II described), but what is un-
usual about the Paris Agreement is just how formidable all of 
these constraints were. As a matter of international law, the ne-
gotiating process was designed to be incredibly cumbersome. The 
negotiations took place as part of the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties, and, under the applicable rules of procedure, the nearly 
two hundred negotiating states need to reach consensus in order 
to make an agreement.218 This challenging requirement was fur-
ther complicated by all the differences between nations that cli-
mate change brings out—differences that go to who bears the 
greatest historic responsibility, who has the most capacity to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions and/or support carbon sinks, and 
who is most steeply suffering the effects of climate change. All 
these factors help explain the painfully slow progression of nego-
tiations under the UNFCCC process. 
By the time of the Paris Agreement, the accretion of prior ne-
gotiating decisions made through the UNFCCC process limited 
what could be done at Paris. One of these limiting prior decisions 
involved the legal form which could be used for a commitment. In 
2011, the Conference of the Parties had agreed in their annual 
 
 218 For an overview of the complexities of the consensus requirement, see Alan Boyle 
and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Climate Change and International Law beyond the UNFCCC, 
in Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray, and Richard G. Tarasofsky, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Climate Change Law 26, 37–39 (Oxford 2016). 
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negotiations that the future commitment would be “a protocol, an-
other legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force un-
der the Convention applicable to all Parties.”219 The Obama ad-
ministration agreed to this formulation in return for a major 
substantive concession,220 but in return it had to forgo the domes-
tic constitutional advantages that would have come with having 
the future instrument be nonbinding under international law. In 
other words, by the time the Conference at Paris came around, 
the president’s negotiators were committed internationally to a 
process that gave up his easiest domestic constitutional path to 
approval.221 
Domestic-law considerations also tightly channeled the scope 
of negotiating possibilities for the Obama administration. Think-
ing ahead to approval, the administration knew it needed an 
agreement that it could join without the Senate or Congress—
first, as a matter of constitutional law; second, as a matter of the 
C-175 process; and third, despite the legislative history from the 
Senate’s advice and consent to the UNFCCC. Thinking ahead to 
implementation, the administration knew it needed an agree-
ment whose terms could at least theoretically be implemented 
through a combination of the president’s independent constitu-
tional powers and preexisting delegations by Congress to adminis-
trative agencies and US states, most notably in the Clean Air Act. 
As a matter of process, this meant that the Obama admin-
istration did not even try to leave the Paris negotiations solely in 
the hands of traditional diplomats. The EPA played a particularly 
prominent role in the negotiations—Administrator Gina 
McCarthy spent the entire week in Paris222—but many other 
 
 219 Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban 
from 28 November to 11 December 2011: Part Two, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 
17th sess (Dec 11, 2011), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 2. 
 220 Daniel Bodansky, The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goal and Options *2 (Har-
vard Project on Climate Agreements, July 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3GZY-QASR 
(explaining that “[t]he United States insisted that it would accept a mandate to negotiate 
a new outcome of a legal nature only if the mandate was ‘symmetrical’ in its application 
to developing as well as developed countries”). 
 221 The Obama administration did use nonbinding commitments as supplements to 
the Paris negotiations, such as a bilateral commitment made with China a year before the 
Paris Conference. See U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change (White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, Nov 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7B39-MZ6S. 
 222 For details of her role there, see U.S. Environmental Regulation after the Paris 
Climate Talks: A Conversation with Gina McCarthy (Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 7, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/FL42-ZFKD. 
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agencies were represented as well.223 Nor were actors outside of 
the executive branch shy about making their voices heard. 
Congressional committees and subcommittees held hearings in 
the weeks leading up to Paris224—including one hearing convened 
by Senator Ted Cruz—and members of both the House and the 
Senate made appearances at Paris. Representatives from nongov-
ernmental organizations in both industry and environment simi-
larly turned up in force at Paris.225 So did a large contingent from 
the government of California; Governor Jerry Brown made mul-
tiple international commitments just before and during the con-
ference.226 These external forces did not alter the executive 
branch’s formal control over US negotiations, but they did make 
the overall process more participatory and more scrutinized. 
As a matter of substance, the domestic constraints mentioned 
above tied the Obama administration’s negotiating hands with 
respect to two central issues under negotiation: first, the reduc-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions and, second, money. On the 
issue of emissions reductions, the Obama administration needed 
to avoid making an internationally legally binding commitment 
 
 223 See Provisional List of Participants, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st sess 
(Dec 1, 2015), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/MISC.2 40–43 (listing representatives from not only 
the White House and the State Department, but also the Departments of Agriculture, 
Commerce, Energy, the Interior, and the Treasury, the EPA, Office of the US Trade Rep-
resentative, US Agency for International Development, National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, and the Forest Service, as well as participants from Congress and 
its staff). 
 224 See generally, for example, Examining the International Climate Negotiations, 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 114th Cong, 1st 
Sess (2015) (“Senate Hearing on Examining Climate Negotiations”); Pitfalls of Unilateral 
Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference, Hearing before the House Committee 
on Science, Space, and Technology, 114th Cong, 1st Sess (2015); Valerie Richardson, Re-
publicans Move to Undermine Obama on Paris Climate Deal (Wash Times, Dec 7, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/CA8G-MB3R (describing the hearing convened by Senator Ted 
Cruz). 
 225 See Provisional List of Participants at 2 (cited in note 223) (noting over seven thou-
sand registered participants from NGOs). 
 226 See David Siders, Jerry Brown Wants All New Cars in California Zero-Emission 
by 2050 (Sacramento Bee, Dec 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R3W3-SJD7 (discuss-
ing a political commitment for future zero-emission cars made between California, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, New York, and several other sovereigns); UN Climate Confer-
ence: Governor Brown, German Government Announce 43 New Signatories to Under 2 
MOU Climate Pact (California Office of the Governor, Dec 9, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/2PPZ-8QMW (mentioning, among other things, a joint declaration with France); 
Chris Megerian, California Isn’t a Country, so Why Are So Many in the State Headed to 
Climate Talks in Paris? (LA Times, Dec 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5QM7-XGK2 
(describing the sizeable California contingent, which included Brown, eight state legisla-
tors, and “a number of top Brown administration officials”). 
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to reduce emissions and, especially, to avoid such a commitment 
with respect to specified targets. A legally binding commitment to 
reduce emissions would have put the Paris Agreement on thinner 
ice as a matter of constitutional law, though still defensible and 
also consistent with the approach taken in some earlier environ-
mental agreements.227 Moreover, it would have been in tension 
with the legislative history associated with the Senate’s advice 
and consent to the UNFCCC, when the executive branch had sig-
naled that it would submit any future protocol with targets and 
timetables as a treaty.228 Combined, these two factors would have 
made it difficult and perhaps impossible for the State Department 
to conclude through the C-175 process that no subsequent ap-
proval from the Senate or Congress was needed. 
The Obama administration resolved this challenge by insist-
ing that the Paris Agreement not contain any legally binding com-
mitments to reduce emissions. Instead, the Agreement requires 
each nation to set a nationally determined contribution (NDC) 
that it “intends to achieve.”229 Nations are legally obligated to 
“prepare, communicate and maintain” these NDCs, but they are 
not legally obligated to meet them.230 Structuring the Paris 
Agreement this way required expert legal work, with careful dis-
tinctions drawn between language meant to signify internation-
ally legally binding commitments (most notably “shall”) and lan-
guage meant to signify nonbinding aspects of the agreement (for 
example, “should,” “aim,” and “are encouraged”). The importance 
of these distinctions to presidential negotiators was highlighted 
by a dramatic last-minute change. The initial final text of 
 
 227 Compare Senate Hearing on Examining Climate Negotiations, 114th Cong 1st Sess 
at 8 (cited in note 224) (testimony of Professor Julian Ku) (“I don’t believe the Constitution 
allows the President to use a sole executive agreement . . . to legally bind the United States 
to particular greenhouse gas emissions targets.”), with Wirth, 39 Harv Envir L Rev at 
552–61 (cited in note 37) (noting various precedents for making sole executive agreements 
with substantive requirements that could be fulfilled under existing domestic environmen-
tal law, including the 2013 Minamata Convention, a 1991 bilateral agreement with Can-
ada, the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and three of that 
Convention’s subsequent protocols). 
 228 See Responses of the Administration to Questions Asked by the Foreign Relations 
Committee, 102d Cong, 2d Sess at 106 (cited in note 210). 
 229 Paris Agreement Art 4(2) (opened for signature Apr 22, 2016), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/2BXZ-DK7W. The Paris Agreement does use the legally binding language “shall” 
for some substantive commitments—for example, it states that the “Parties shall pursue 
domestic mitigation measures,” but, instead of requiring any particular type of commit-
ment, it then simply specifies that these measures will have “the aim of achieving the 
objectives of” the NDCs. Paris Agreement Art 4(2) (emphasis added). 
 230 See Paris Agreement Art 4(2). 
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Article 4(4) stated that: “Developed country Parties shall con-
tinue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute 
emission reduction targets.”231 Horrified and believing that this 
language was introduced in error, US negotiators insisted that 
the word “should” be substituted for “shall.” Secretary Kerry said 
in essence that, “Either it changes, or President Obama and the 
United States will not be able to support this agreement.”232 In 
the final moments, the change was made, nominally as a correc-
tion to a drafting error.233 
Another key domestic constraint related to money. Part of the 
core climate deal is for developing countries to receive very large 
amounts of financial support for their efforts to combat climate 
change. In the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations, the commitment 
that was reached set specified levels of support that developed 
countries would mobilize for developing countries—levels which 
were to rise to the overall sum of $100 billion a year by 2020.234 At 
Paris, the developing countries wanted this commitment made in 
a legally binding way. While the Obama administration could be 
sure of its ability to provide some seed money to developing coun-
tries,235 it could not be sure a successor administration would do 
so, and it certainly could not commit to large, continuing contri-
butions at a level that would require congressional appropria-
tions. The Obama administration thus had strong reasons for 
wanting to avoid any international legal obligation to commit 
meaningful sums of money to developing countries. Looking to ap-
proval, such an obligation would strengthen the constitutional 
concerns about bypassing the Senate and Congress;236 and looking 
 
 231 See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the President, Draft Decision, 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st sess (Dec 12, 2015), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 
21 (emphasis added). 
 232 Warrick, How One Word Nearly Killed the Climate Deal (cited in note 20) (quoting 
Kerry’s description of his conversation with the Conference President). 
 233 See John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal (The Guard-
ian, Dec 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/S8LZ-H8GC (describing this sharply con-
tentious issue). 
 234 See Copenhagen Accord at 7 (cited in note 216). 
 235 In 2016, for example, the Obama administration provided $500 million for this 
purpose using discretionary funding. Timothy Cama, Obama Pays $500M to UN Climate 
Change Fund (The Hill, Mar 3, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/32T2-KFUF. 
 236 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 222–23 (cited in note 11) (discussing a 1969 Senate 
resolution expressing the view that a sole executive agreement should not “promise to 
assist a foreign country . . . by the use of the . . . financial resources of the United States”). 
Although this resolution does not formally bind the president, it does signal the need to 
tread especially cautiously as a matter of constitutional law when financial commitments 
are concerned. See id. 
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to implementation, it would be close to impossible to meet such 
an obligation without affirmative support from Congress. In the 
end, negotiators once again struck a delicate balance. The Paris 
Agreement itself states that “[d]eveloped country Parties shall 
provide financial resources to assist developing country Par-
ties,”237 but it does not specify the amounts for which developed 
countries (let alone individual countries among them) are respon-
sible. Instead, the $100-billion-a-year figure from Copenhagen 
was reiterated only in a separate conference decision that accom-
panied the Paris Agreement.238 
As all this suggests, the Obama administration had very lim-
ited space for maneuvering in the Paris negotiations. Its hands 
were tied not only by political constraints, but also by legal ones. 
From international law, it had to contend with layers and layers 
of international process and with the substantive limits locked in 
by previous negotiations. On the domestic side, its constraints did 
not come from asserted claims about what the Senate or Congress 
would approve, as it was clear that they were not going to end up 
approving the Paris Agreement. Instead, these domestic con-
straints derived from the limited scope of what could be done in 
the absence of the Senate or Congress. That these constraints 
were strong and credible is shown by how much the Paris 
Agreement was tailored to accommodate them. 
2. Approval. 
As the discussion above shows, concerns about domestic ap-
proval folded into the negotiating process. Although the interna-
tional legal backdrop prevented the climate commitment from be-
ing entirely nonbinding, the Obama administration succeeded in 
negotiating an agreement that it considered it could join without 
subsequent approval from the Senate as a treaty or Congress as 
an ex post congressional-executive agreement. It did so by insist-
ing that the aspects of the agreement most vulnerable to consti-
tutional concern be made nonbinding or nonspecific. The end re-
sult is an agreement that illustrates Professor Koh’s observation 
that “we are now moving to a whole host of less crystalline, more 
nuanced forms of international legal engagement and cooperation 
that do not fall neatly within any of the[ ] three pigeonholes” of 
 
 237 Paris Agreement Art 9(1). 
 238 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st sess 
(Jan 29, 2016), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 8, 17 at ¶¶ 53, 114. 
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treaty, congressional-executive agreement, and sole executive 
agreement.239 Obama made the Paris Agreement mainly on his 
own constitutional authority, but he was buttressed in doing so 
by the fact that this Agreement furthers both the preexisting 
UNFCCC and the goals underlying the Clean Air Act. The expert 
lawyering that enabled the Obama administration to walk this 
line sparked admiration from former Bush administration law-
yers John Bellinger and Goldsmith.240 
The Paris Agreement illustrates the broader overall shift de-
scribed in this Article from constitutional checks to administra-
tive ones. Despite its careful crafting to minimize constitutional 
concerns, it will probably be viewed broadly by future administra-
tions as a historical practice justifying sweeping constitutional 
powers of the president to make sole executive agreements when 
the commitments made in these agreements can be implemented 
through preexisting domestic law.241 Yet it may also lead in the 
long run to changes to the C-175 Procedure in ways that make it 
less opaque and perhaps more regularized. Intriguingly, at a 2016 
congressional hearing involving the Paris Agreement, one wit-
ness who was asserting that the Paris Agreement should go to the 
Senate based this claim on the C-175 Procedure factors far more 
than on the Constitution.242 To the interest of several present rep-
resentatives, he argued for more transparency to the C-175 
Procedure.243 The more the president is unconstrained constitu-
tionally with regard to approval, the more such administrative-
law principles may come to the fore. 
 
 239 Koh, 101 Georgetown L J at 726 (cited in note 14). See also Bodansky and Spiro, 
49 Vand J Transnatl L at 887 (cited in note 37) (describing international agreements that 
are supported but not specifically authorized by Congress as “executive agreements+”). 
 240 See Chris Mooney and Juliet Eilperin, Obama’s Rapid Move to Join the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement Could Tie Up the Next President (Wash Post, Apr 11, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9G4G-VG8H (quoting Bellinger); Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 466–67, 
469–72 (cited in note 37). 
 241 See Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1042–45 (cited in note 82) (describing how the ex-
ecutive branch tends to read its past practices broadly). While President Trump has an-
nounced his intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, so far he has 
not repudiated Obama’s legal authority to have made the commitment in the first place. 
See Nick Juliano, What Does Trump’s Paris Climate Decision Mean? (Politico, May 31, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4MUW-JH5V (noting that “Trump apparently decided 
not to treat the Paris deal as a treaty and submit it for a Senate ratification vote, which 
would surely fail”). 
 242 See House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 43–
44, 48–52, 59, 63–68 (cited in note 17) (testimony of Steven Groves). 
 243 See id at 59, 64–68. 
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3. Implementation. 
The decision to forgo the unachievable approval of the Senate 
or Congress left Obama in a fragile position with regard to imple-
mentation. As a matter of international law, he locked the next 
administration into the Paris Agreement for four years from its 
entry into force, unless the Trump administration wishes to in-
voke a one-year route that is available if it also withdraws from 
the UNFCCC.244 As a matter of domestic law, however, Obama’s 
ability to have the Paris Agreement implemented depended in the 
immediate future on the EPA and the federal courts—and in the 
longer term on the next administration, on future Congresses, 
and on the international legal process. In short, as in the nego-
tiations, the President’s powers were curtailed on all sides. 
Most immediately, in relying on the Clean Air Act for imple-
mentation of the NDC submitted by the United States, Obama 
necessarily accepted the process and limits that come with that 
Act. He thus became dependent on the EPA, which in turn must 
act within the constraints of the Clean Air Act and the APA.245 In 
June 2014, the EPA provided for notice and comment a proposed 
rule known as the Clean Power Plan. This proposed rule sought 
to reduce emissions from existing power plants and gave consid-
erable flexibility to state agencies with regard to implementa-
tion.246 After the receipt of over four million comments, the EPA 
issued its final rule in the fall of 2015.247 This rule was arguably 
crucial to the ability of the United States to meet its NDC.248 But 
 
 244 Paris Agreement Art 28; UNFCCC Art 25, 1771 UNTS at 187. 
 245 In addition, the EPA has institutional reasons to be attentive to congressional con-
cerns in determining how far it is willing to go both in its legal interpretations and its uses 
of discretion. See Devin Henry, Spending Bill Keeps EPA Funding Flat in 2016 (The Hill, 
Dec 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AG4D-T95X (describing the failure of attempts 
to tie the EPA budget to the absence of climate action but noting that, overall, “[t]he bill 
keeps agency staffing levels at their lowest level since 1989”). 
 246 See Bulman-Pozen, 102 Va L Rev at 966–67, 982–87 (cited in note 139) (describing 
the functional federalism in this rule). The Clean Power Plan is not the only action the 
EPA is taking with respect to climate change, but it is the most significant to date. See A 
Conversation with Gina McCarthy (cited in note 222). 
 247 See generally Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the Numbers (EPA), archived at 
http://perma.cc/F3GU-P33D; Environmental Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emis-
sion Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed 
Reg 64662 (2015), amending 40 CFR Part 60. This rule was thus finalized before the com-
pletion of the Paris negotiations. 
 248 See Cary Coglianese, When Management-Based Regulation Goes Global (RegBlog, 
Dec 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T8LE-BM7K. It is possible that the United 
States could meet its NDC without the Clean Power Plan due to other factors, such as tax 
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over twenty states and countless other parties challenged many 
aspects of the rule, and the Supreme Court stayed its implemen-
tation during this litigation by a 5–4 vote just a few days before 
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016.249 
This challenge to implementation would have awaited even a 
successor to Obama who was friendly to the Paris Agreement. So 
too would other challenges. At the international level, the Paris 
Agreement left many issues to the complex and ongoing negotiat-
ing process, including aspects of such crucial matters as increased 
emissions reduction, compliance, and funding. At the domestic 
level, congressional support would have been needed in the long 
run for funding purposes, so as to support developing countries in 
pursuing emission reductions. 
The first year of the Trump administration has illustrated yet 
another check on Obama’s power with respect to the Paris 
Agreement: the ability of a future president to roll back the com-
mitments of his or her predecessor. Shortly after taking office, 
President Trump instructed his EPA administrator to review the 
Clean Power Plan and “if appropriate . . . as soon as practicable 
suspend, revise, or rescind” it.250 He then announced that the 
United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement, pre-
sumably pursuant to its withdrawal provisions, and would in the 
meantime fail to implement it.251 By contrast, while Trump has 
expressed skepticism of some major international commitments 
that received the explicit approval of the Senate or Congress (such 
as NAFTA and NATO), to date he has not triggered withdrawal 
from these commitments.252 
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement il-
lustrates to other nations just how fragile international commit-
ments made by the executive branch without explicit congres-
sional buy-in can be. Assuming that Trump’s decision to 
withdraw is indeed carried out, one might wonder whether it will 
 
credits for renewables, state and local climate-mitigation measures, or a substantial eco-
nomic contraction, but prospects for this are far from clear. Indeed, it is not even clear that 
the United States would succeed in meeting the NDC with the Clean Power Plan in place. 
See Warren Cornwall, United States Will Miss Paris Climate Targets without Further Ac-
tion, Study Finds (Science, Sept 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3YM6-UN53. 
 249 West Virginia v Environmental Protection Agency, 136 S Ct 1000, 1000 (2016). 
 250 Executive Order 13783 § 4, 82 Fed Reg at 16095 (cited in note 163). 
 251 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (cited in note 22). 
 252 See Ashley Parker, et al, ‘I Was All Set to Terminate’: Inside Trump’s Sudden Shift 
on NAFTA (Wash Post, Apr 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2TLL-A5ZB; Jenna 
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cause other nations to be unwilling to make such commitments 
with the United States in the future. But while it should increase 
their skepticism, it is unlikely to turn them off such commitments 
entirely. For one thing, a commitment that receives the explicit 
approval of Congress or the Senate will often be impossible to ob-
tain, and other nations frequently will prefer an executive branch 
commitment, with all its limits, to no commitment at all. Further-
more, even withdrawn executive branch commitments can leave 
footprints that are followed by other institutional actors. The 
courts will have power to review the Trump administration’s ef-
forts to repeal the Clean Power Plan. And already many US cities 
and some states have signaled their intention to reduce emissions 
in compliance with the Paris Agreement despite Trump’s pro-
posed withdrawal.253 For just as other institutional actors can 
serve as checks on executive power in the making of international 
commitments, so too can they check the effects of withdrawal. 
* * * 
Overall, the Paris Agreement demonstrates both the strength 
and the fragility of the president’s power to choose. In order to 
bypass the Senate or Congress at the approval stage, Obama 
needed the nearly two hundred other countries at Paris to agree 
to core US negotiating demands and for the EPA to conclude it 
could and would issue various emissions-reducing regulations un-
der its preexisting statutory authority. Yet the success of the 
Paris Agreement has proved fragile at best. For the United States 
to meet its commitments, Obama knew or should have known 
that all of the following would be needed: the courts to uphold the 
EPA’s regulations aimed at climate mitigation, the next admin-
istration to retain existing efforts aimed at the implementation of 
the Paris Agreement, and Congress to eventually provide appro-
priations that further mitigation efforts outside the United 
States.254 That Obama chose to accept the full force of these con-
straints rather than aim for specific legislative approval of the 
 
 253 Open Letter to the International Community and Parties to the Paris Agreement 
from US State, Local, and Business Leaders (We Are Still In, June 5, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/EQM2-FWZ7 (containing the pledge of nine states and numerous cities 
and counties “to continue to support climate action to meet the Paris Agreement”). 
 254 A lesser threshold would be needed for the United States to remain in the Paris 
Agreement and make meaningful though inadequate efforts to comply with it. The Trump 
administration could block even the achievement of this threshold, however, by withdraw-
ing the United States from the Paris Agreement or potentially by impeding the efforts of 
states like California that are pursuing emissions reductions. 
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Paris Agreement is a signal of just how impossible it would have 
been to get this approval. For those who believe that there is no 
substitute for specific approval from the Senate or Congress, the 
existence of an alternative set of constraints will be no consola-
tion. But those who are concerned about both unconstrained pres-
idential power and undue legislative gridlock should have reason 
to value the current system. 
CONCLUSION 
US foreign policy depends heavily on international commit-
ments made without the specific approval of the Senate or 
Congress. This has long been true, but high-profile commitments 
like the Iran deal and the Paris Agreement made this salient and 
the subject of renewed scrutiny. The Obama administration’s bold 
decisions to bypass the Senate and Congress appropriately invite 
inquiry as to whether the president now has too much power in 
this domain. This concern is an especially important one at the 
start of a new administration whose actions on other fronts have 
already triggered concerns about executive overreaching. 
As this Article has shown, important checks on presidential 
power remain with respect to the making of international com-
mitments. But we will not see most of them if we look only at con-
stitutional law and only at the process of domestic approval for 
commitments. Instead, the checks are spread across strands of 
law—constitutional, international, and administrative—and 
across the negotiation, approval, and implementation of commit-
ments. Institutionally, they exist not only through the classic con-
stitutional actors on Capitol Hill, but also via international or-
ganizations, administrative agencies, and even sometimes US 
states. The resulting web of checks is not perfect. In some places 
it is too weak and in other places it is too strong. But overall it 
does a good job of balancing the imperatives of US international 
engagement with the need for constraints on presidential power. 
Although this Article has focused on the making of interna-
tional commitments, the approach taken here has implications for 
foreign relations law more generally. Thinking about checks and 
balances only from the perspective of constitutional law is like 
looking for the keys under the lamppost. It is a natural choice but 
not always the right one. The international landscape is increas-
ingly shaped by legal order rather than anarchy, and administra-
tive law more and more affects how the executive branch engages 
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internationally. These changes matter for how power is allocated 
and constrained in the practice of US foreign relations law. 
